ON FALSE REALISM

The diverse forms of Realism. Those who held that universals actually exist in the nature of things divided into different opinions. Plato¹, since he denied that true science can be given of singulars — which are in perpetual flux — and yet wished to avoid the error of the sensualists, invented certain universal natures separated from singulars, which he called ideas, and of which science treats. Universals, therefore, are certain forms separated from singulars, subsisting in themselves and through themselves, by participation in which singulars are constituted. Some hold that Plato by his subsisting forms meant the divine ideas; from which the Ontologists took the occasion to conceive universals as divine ideas seen intuitively by our mind. Universals, therefore, would be the greatest realities — existing not in things, but in the divine mind.Others, conceding that universals cannot exist separately from individuals, assert that universals are found in the individuals themselves, formally and actually, prior to any concept of the mind. This opinion had Gilbert of Porreta as its defender²; it is also attributed to William of Champeaux, though perhaps that author exceeded more in his manner of speaking than in the matter itself. Scotus defends an opinion related to this, saying that the nature outside the intellect and in singulars has a certain negative community by reason of which it can be called universal prior to any consideration by the mind.Finally, several thinkers have extended Realism all the way to pantheism itself — such as David of Dinant in the Middle Ages, and in our own day the Transcendental Critics, of whom there is discussion in Part I of the Philosophy of Nature.First conclusion: Platonic Realism is entirely contradictory. First argument. The Platonic universal would be simultaneously in singulars and outside singulars. But this is a manifest contradiction. Therefore, the Platonic universal is fictitious and impossible. It would be outside singulars, as Plato supposes; and yet it would be within singulars — which is shown as follows: What is constitutive of a thing is within the thing. But universals are constitutive of singulars; for humanity is the essential constitutive of Socrates, since Socrates is called and is essentially a man. Therefore universals must be within singulars.Second argument. Plato admits separate ideas precisely in order to preserve the perpetuity of science. But with the Platonic universal admitted, true science is destroyed. Therefore, Plato introduces contradictory results. Proof of the minor: true science is perfected through knowledge of a proper substance, not through knowledge of a separate and extrinsic substance. But the Platonic universal is supposed to be a substance separate from and extrinsic to the things that surround us. Therefore, no true science of the things that surround us could be had. But with science of the things that surround us failing, all other science vanishes, because we cannot know spiritual and immaterial things unless we are guided by material and sensible ones. Therefore, with Plato’s opinion accepted, all true science is destroyed.Third argument. If Plato is consistent with himself, he must admit not only subsisting species but also subsisting genera and accidents, since there is science of genera and of accidents — e.g., of virtue and wisdom. But it is absurd to conceive of accidents subsisting by themselves; it is absurd to conceive of a subsisting and separate genus — e.g., some animal in general that would be neither rational nor irrational and yet would really exist. Therefore, the Platonic universal is absurd and impossible.Second conclusion: Ontological Realism either does not reach the point of the difficulty or falls into pantheism. Proof: When saying “Universals are divine ideas,” the Ontologists either speak of the universal in representing and causing, or of the universal in being. If the former, they say something true indeed — for divine ideas represent all things and are moreover the exemplars and cause of things — but this is to evade the question, since what is at issue here is universals in being.If they choose the latter, they introduce pantheism. For universals in being constitute intrinsically the essence of singulars. Therefore, if divine ideas are universals in being, they constitute intrinsically the nature of singulars. But divine ideas are the very divine being. Therefore, the divine being intrinsically constitutes the essence of singulars. Now, what constitutes the essence of something is predicated essentially of it. Therefore, the divine being can be predicated essentially of singulars, and it will be true to say: “singulars are essentially the divine being” — which is pure and outright pantheism.Objection. The universal is necessary, immutable, eternal. But a being of this kind is only God. Therefore, universals exist only in God. So argues John Sans-Fiel³.Response. Distinguish: the universal is necessary, etc., with respect to existence — denied; with respect to essence — subdistinguish: with participated necessity and immutability, and with negative eternity — conceded; with unparticipated immutability and necessity, and with positive eternity — denied. Contradistinguish the minor and deny the conclusion. The solution is clear from what was said in Art. I, on the properties of universals.Universals, or the essences of things, are necessary and immutable in this sense: that no essential predicate can be removed without the essence being destroyed — the nature of man perishes if animality or rationality is removed — but this is necessity in a qualified sense. They are called eternal because they abstract from this or that time. They are not, however, positively eternal, since existence belongs to them only contingently and accidentally. It is therefore manifest that essences of this kind are not God, who is absolutely necessary being and positively eternal.Third conclusion: Nature is not actually universal prior to the operation of the intellect; and therefore the empirical Realism of Gilbert and his school is contradictory. Whatever belongs to a nature either belongs to it in itself, or according to its existence in singulars, or according to its existence in the intellect. But the actually universal does not belong to the nature either in itself or according to its existence in singulars. Therefore, it belongs to it only according to the operation of the intellect, and therefore, prior to the operation of the intellect, the nature is not actually universal. Proof of the minor: the actually universal is either communicability to many or abstraction from many. But communicability to many or abstraction from many does not belong to the nature either in itself or according to its existence in singulars. Therefore. Not in itself — as has often been shown. For what belongs to a nature in itself is placed in its definition. But abstraction or communicability is not placed in the definition of a nature; for man is defined as “rational animal,” not as “one communicable to many” or “one abstracted from many.” Moreover, if the nature in itself were common, it could never be found as singular; if in itself it implied precision and exclusion from individuals, it could never be found in individuals — for what belongs to something in itself belongs to it always and invariably.A fortiori, communicability or abstraction from many does not belong to the nature according to its existence in singulars. The nature in singulars is divided and distinct from others, and has such individuating principles that it is entirely its own. But a nature distinct from others, a nature that is its own, is not common to others nor communicable to others. Therefore, it is contradictory for communicability to belong to the nature according to its existence in singulars. The abstracted nature, moreover, is undivided and indeterminate. But every singular nature, by the very fact of being posited on the side of reality, becomes determinate, concrete, and distinct from others. Therefore it is contradictory for the abstracted universal to belong to the nature according to its existence in singulars. Therefore, the nature is not said to be actually universal except according to its existence in the intellect. Hence the Aristotelian axiom: “The universal (in act) either is nothing, or is posterior” — that is, exists in the intellect.Fourth conclusion: Although the nature in itself can be said to be common negatively, yet as it is in reality and outside the intellect, it can by no means be called common — neither positively nor negatively; and therefore the Realism of the Scotists is contradictory⁴.That is said to be common negatively which is not in itself singular. Now, the nature in itself is not universal, and for this reason cannot be said to be positively common; and on the other hand it is not in itself singular, and for this reason can be said to be negatively common. But as soon as the nature is posited on the side of reality, it loses this negative community. This is briefly shown:To be negatively common is not to be divided and multiplied in many. But the nature, as soon as it is posited on the side of reality in singulars, is divided in many and truly and positively multiplied in many; thus human nature is multiplied in Peter and Paul. Therefore it no longer remains negatively common. Just as air — says John of St. Thomas — when light is placed in it does not remain negatively dark, because the illumination itself expels the negation of light; so the singularization of the nature on the side of reality expels the negation of singularity that the nature had in itself.Difficulties are resolved. First difficulty. The nature that is in Peter and Paul exists really. But the nature that is in Peter and Paul is one and common. Therefore, on the side of reality there exists some nature that is one and common to many — and hence universal.Response. Distinguish the minor: the nature in Peter and Paul is one and common — with the unity and commonality of similarity — conceded; with real unity and commonality — denied. And deny the conclusion.The nature of Peter and the nature of Paul have conforming and similar predicates, and this is sufficient for the intellect to form from them one species. Nonetheless, the nature of Peter is really divided and distinct from the nature of Paul, and therefore these two natures do not have real unity.Counter-objection. But unity of similarity suffices for the universal. Therefore the difficulty remains.I deny the antecedent: just as for the universal in causing there is required one cause really relating to many effects, so for the universal in being there is required one essence really relating to many individuals. Therefore, unity of similarity does not suffice — real unity is required.Second difficulty. The objects of the sciences are universals. But the objects of the sciences exist on the side of reality. Therefore universals exist really.Response. Distinguish the major: the objects of the sciences are universals fundamentally and with respect to the thing conceived — conceded; they are universals formally and with respect to the state of abstraction and universality — denied. Distinguish the minor: the objects of the sciences exist on the side of reality according to the reality of their entity — conceded; according to the state of universality — denied; and deny the consequent.Question: In order to fully resolve this difficulty about the existence of the universal on the side of reality, it is asked whether aptitude and indifference toward many belong to things prior to the operation of the intellect. This aptitude, as John of St. Thomas notes, can be considered formally and positively, insofar as it regards inferiors, or fundamentally, as the capacity itself or non-repugnance for regarding inferiors and descending to them. If considered in the first way, it is clear that it does not belong prior to the operation of the intellect, since it is universality itself in act. The difficulty concerns the second way. It has already been said that the nature in itself is negatively common. The question is therefore whether, by reason of this negative community, there is found in the nature considered in itself some non-repugnance or capacity for being in many and being predicated of them.Fifth conclusion: This aptitude, or non-repugnance, which is the proximate foundation of universality, is by no means found in the nature in itself, nor as contracted in individuals, but only in the nature made precise by the intellect. This non-repugnance for being in many therefore follows the nature by reason of its state, not by reason of its quiddity. This conclusion belongs to St. Thomas and is common among the Thomists. So says John of St. Thomas⁵.Proof: the aptitude for being in many is the capacity for a nature existing as one to be multiplied into many — or in other words, it presupposes something one that is multiplicable into many. But neither the nature in itself nor the nature as contracted in singulars is something one that is multiplicable into many. Therefore, the aptitude for being in many does not belong to the nature prior to the operation of the intellect. Proof of the minor: the nature contracted in singulars, far from being something one multiplicable into many, actually has repugnance toward such multiplication, since an individual is something indivisible and unmultiplicable. The nature in itself, however, implies neither unity nor multiplicability, but expresses only quiddititative predicates, among which no unity multiplicable into many is placed.Therefore, the aptitude for being in many belongs to the abstracted nature. For through abstraction the nature becomes one with the unity of precision, and — because it is supposed to be abstracted from many — it can be conceived as multiplicable into those many.What unity belongs to the nature existing on the side of reality in singulars. The nature existing in singulars has a twofold unity: formal and numerical. Proof: formal unity is that which follows the formal and essential principles by which a thing is constituted in its species; numerical unity is that which follows the material and individuating principles by which a thing is constituted as singular. Now, the nature existing on the side of reality in Peter has its formal principles by which it is constituted in its species, and its individuating principles by which it is constituted as singular. Therefore it has both formal and numerical unity.Now, this unity is not something common to many, but there are as many formal unities on the side of reality as there are individuals. For unity follows nature; therefore, if in each individual the nature is really distinct from the nature in another, the unity consequent upon it will also be really distinct. But in each individual the nature is really distinct from the nature in another — just as the nature in Socrates is really distinguished from the nature in Plato. Therefore the formal unity in one is really distinguished from the formal unity in another; and therefore there are as many formal unities as there are individuals.From this follows a brief and effective refutation of all Realism. There does not exist anything one that is common to many. But the universal, formally so called, is one thing common to many; for there are two things in the concept of the universal: unity and commonality — unity in itself and commonality in many. Therefore, no universal formally so called exists in singulars.What predicates belong to the nature existing on the side of reality. The Realists object: all real predicates belong to the nature existing on the side of reality. But the aptitude for being in many is a real predicate. Therefore, the aptitude for being in many belongs to the nature existing on the side of reality.Response. I deny the minor. For understanding this, it must be noted that the predicates that can be attributed to any nature are of three kinds. Some are quiddititative — whether positive or negative — which are founded in the essence; others are real accidental predicates, such as “being learned” which belongs to man; and finally, some are logical or fictitious predicates, such as “being a species” which belongs to man. Predicates of the first kind must be ascribed to the nature in whatever state: in itself, in singulars, and in the intellect. Predicates of the second kind belong to the nature even as existing in singulars; thus “being learned” or “being virtuous” belongs to man on the side of reality. Predicates of the third kind, finally, belong to the nature only as existing in the intellect, since they are beings of reason. Now, the aptitude for being in many is of this kind: it is not a real quiddititative predicate, because quiddity in itself is neither universal nor singular; nor is it a real accidental predicate, for real accidents individuate the subject rather than rendering it fitted to be in many. Therefore, the aptitude for being in many is a logical — or fictitious — predicate, which belongs to the nature only through the operation of the intellect.The predicates, therefore, that belong to the nature existing on the side of reality are of only two kinds: quiddititative predicates, whether positive or negative — as to the man existing in the nature of things is attributed being rational and not being capable of neighing; and real accidental predicates — as to the man existing belongs being wise, learned, virtuous, etc.

1 Cf. Henri Martin, Études sur le Timée; Cousin, vol. II, lec. 7 and 8.

2 On Gilbert of Porreta, see Abbé Bertaud, Gilbert de la Porrée, Lib. Oudin.

3 Cf. also Gerdil, Défense du sentiment du P. Malebranche, lec. 6.

4 Cf. Scotus, Metaph., VII, q. 18; and II Sent. dist. 3, q. 1; Frassen, De universalibus, q. 2.

5 Log. II, P. Q. III, art. 5.