SYSTEMS THAT DENY ALL REALITY TO UNIVERSALS

The opinions are set forth. With the notion of universals established, there arises the notable question of whether universals have some objective value — that is, whether any entity or nature corresponds to the words and concepts of universals. Four systems have existed on this matter: Nominalism, Conceptualism, Absolute Realism, and Moderate Realism. Nominalism holds that universals exist only in names — that they are mere breath of the voice; Conceptualism maintains that they exist only in the mind — that they are mere concepts; Absolute Realism contends that universals exist formally in things; Moderate Realism, finally, teaches that the logical universal and also the metaphysical universal with respect to the mode of conceiving exist only in the mind, while the metaphysical universal with respect to the thing conceived — that is, the universal signifying the nature with respect to its essential predicates — exists on the side of reality, but only in singulars. We will examine each system in turn.Nominalism. This was the most ancient opinion of the materialists Heraclitus and Democritus, who, admitting nothing beyond the senses, said that no science of sensible things can be given, because they are in perpetual flux. Indeed, Cratylus “fell into such madness,” says Aristotle¹, “that he thought one ought to say nothing in words, since the truth of a thing passed away before the speech was finished.” All of these implicitly admitted that universals are mere names. This opinion was revived with new apparatus by the Nominalists of the twelfth century — Roscelin and others, and later William of Ockham. Hobbes, Hume, the more recent Sensualists, Condillac and others, Taine and the Positivists adhere to this position more or less.Conclusion: Absolute Nominalism is false and absurd.First argument. There is no spoken word without a mental word. But there is a spoken word for universals. Therefore there is a mental word for universals, and hence universals exist at least in the mind as words or concepts of the mind.The major is easily understood. That is called a spoken word which conveys some meaning and therefore expresses some concept. If it refers to no concept, it may be a sound but not a word. It is clear, therefore, that some concept — some mental word — is presupposed by the spoken word. The minor is manifest: the Nominalists, in disputing about universals, certainly intend to signify something. Therefore they acknowledge that there is a spoken name for universals. From which we argue as follows:You acknowledge some signification in the names of universals. But unless universals are at least mental concepts, they signify nothing at all. Therefore, if universals are mere names, you introduce an absurdity.Proof of the minor: if the names of universals do not express a universal thing, it remains that they signify either some singular or a collection of singulars. But they do not signify some singular, since they are applied to many; nor do they signify a collection of singulars. For the names of universals are applied to each individual. But collective names cannot be applied to each one individually — for not every soldier is called an army. Moreover, if the names of universals designate a collection of individuals, then when one says “Peter is a man,” the sense will be: “Peter is a collection of men” — which is absurd. Therefore, if the names of universals do not signify some universal thing or some mental concept, they present nothing at all to the mind².Furthermore, the Nominalists dispute about universals not only with words, not only with the imagination, but especially with the mind. But the mind cannot dispute about things that are entirely hidden from it. Therefore, by the very act in which they deny the existence of universals, they posit that universals are known by the mind. But whatever is known by the mind exists in the mind. Therefore, by denying that universals are in the mind, they by that very act posit that universals exist in the mind — which is a contradiction in the exercise of the act itself.Second argument. Since universals are objects of science, if they are mere names, all our science is confined within pure sensible words and empty breaths of voice. But there can be no true and firm science of sensible things, which are in perpetual flux. Therefore, Nominalism destroys all true science³.Conceptualism. Absolute Nominalism gradually faded away with Roscelin and was succeeded by moderate Nominalism, which has been called Conceptualism. This system concedes that universals are not mere names but true concepts of the mind; but it contends, on the other hand, that they are nothing other than fictions or subjective forms of the intellect to which no proper reality corresponds. This opinion is commonly attributed to Abelard, though perhaps without foundation, since Abelard’s true position is not clearly established⁴. Buridan, Peter of Ailly, Gabriel Biel, Gregory of Rimini, and the other more moderate Nominalists have agreed with this view. In general, those philosophers who admit innate ideas adhere to Conceptualism — such as Descartes and his disciples and all the idealists — as does Kant, who posits twelve universal forms to be in the intellect a priori⁵.Conclusion: Moderate Nominalism, or Conceptualism, is also entirely to be rejected.We freely concede to the Conceptualists that the formal universal, or universal in the precisive sense, does not actually exist on the side of reality; but we deny their other assertion, namely that universals do not exist in things fundamentally and with respect to the thing conceived.First argument. Universals are true concepts expressing one thing fitted to be in many. But these concepts will be false and absurd unless some entity or nature on the side of reality corresponds to them as their foundation. Therefore, universals are not mere fictions of the intellect; rather, some entity on the side of reality corresponds to them as their foundation. Proof of the minor: just as names are signs of concepts, so concepts are signs of things. Now, nothing is in the sign unless it is in some way in the thing signified. Therefore, just as names are not true names unless some concept corresponds to them, so concepts are not true concepts unless some thing — some reality on the side of reality — corresponds to them.Second argument. What belongs to individuals in some way independently of any concept of the mind is not a pure concept. But the universal belongs to individuals in some way independently of any concept of the mind. Therefore it is not a pure concept. Proof of the minor: in this predication — “Socrates is a man; Plato is a man” — “man” belongs to the individuals Socrates and Plato independently of my concept. But “man” is a universal. Therefore the universal belongs to individuals independently of the mind. The last minor is clarified: “Man” in this predication is not a singular name, as is evident; it is not a collective name, because the sense would then be “Socrates is a collection of men”; but it designates the nature expressed by definition. Now, the nature expressed by definition is the metaphysical universal with respect to the thing conceived. Therefore.Third argument. Universals, as has often been said, are the objects of science. But science is not about pure concepts, but properly about things; for the scientist does not properly desire to know what the subjective forms of our intellect are, but what the intrinsic nature of things is. Therefore, universals must not be pure concepts but must have real foundations in nature.Difficulties are resolved.First difficulty. The universal is a collection of individuals, just as the human species designates a collection of men. But nothing corresponds to this collection on the side of reality except individuals. Therefore, the universal is a concept to which nothing corresponds on the side of reality except individuals.Setting aside other responses, I deny the major. Nominalists and Conceptualists confuse the names and concepts of universals with collective names and concepts — a confusion that must be most carefully avoided. How greatly distributive concepts differ from collective ones we have shown more than once, and it is most evident. For when we say “Peter is a man” and “Paul is a man,” we do not in the least signify by that term a collection of men, but human nature itself. Now, this nature exists really in Peter and in Paul and in other men — not only in the mind.Second difficulty. Every nature that really exists is singular and individual. But if every nature that really exists is singular, it is clear that the universal exists only in the mind. Therefore.Response. Distinguish the major: every nature that really exists is singular essentially and in itself — denied; by accident and by reason of what accompanies it — conceded. Contradistinguish the minor: if every nature that really exists is essentially and in itself singular, the universal exists only in the intellect — conceded; if the nature is singular only by reason of what accompanies it, universals exist only in the intellect — denied.Explanation: no nature exists unless it is received in some individual and singular subject. But although it subsists in the singular, it does not follow that it is in itself singular. For the nature, insofar as it is in itself, expresses only essential predicates; and to be singular is an accidental predicate. Wherefore, if the nature exists in the state of singularity, this happens by reason of what accompanies it — that is, by reason of the subject in which it is received — but in itself it is not contracted by singularity. Now consider: if the nature in itself and essentially were singular, universals would exist only in the intellect, as is clear; but if the nature in itself abstracts from the state of singularity, it can provide the foundation for universality; and for this reason we say that universals exist fundamentally in things.Third difficulty. The universal expresses communicability to many, or abstraction from many. But the state of communicability or abstraction is not in things but in the intellect. Therefore, universals are not in things but in the intellect.Response. Distinguish the major: the logical universal expresses communicability, and the metaphysical universal with respect to the mode of conceiving expresses abstraction from many — conceded; the metaphysical universal with respect to the thing conceived expresses communicability or abstraction — denied. Concede the minor and distinguish the conclusion: therefore the logical universal and the metaphysical universal with respect to the mode of conceiving are only in the intellect — conceded; the universal with respect to the thing conceived is only in the intellect — denied.The response is clear from what has been said about the notion of universals. Three things can be considered in universals: first, the nature of the thing in itself; second, the abstraction of this nature from individuals; third, universality, or communicability to many. Abstraction and the intention of universality are the work of the intellect; but the nature to which abstraction or the intention of universality accrues exists on the side of reality. This nature is the universal with respect to the thing conceived.Fourth difficulty. But the nature in itself is not universal. Therefore, it cannot be granted that any universal exists on the side of reality.Response. The nature in itself is not properly, actually, formally universal — conceded; it provides no foundation for universality — denied. The nature in itself exhibits essential predicates, which are uniform and similar in all individuals of the same species; from which it is provided that the intellect forms a concept of something common to all individuals and attributes to the nature itself the intention of universality. I distinguish the consequent: universals do not exist properly, actually, formally — conceded; they do not exist fundamentally outside the intellect — denied.That the response may be more fully understood, the system of the Realists is to be examined.

1 Cf. Metaphysics, bk. IV, text 22.

2“Absolute nominalism contradicts itself by admitting signs that signify nothing.” Janet, Traité de Philos., n. 160.

3“Absolute nominalism is incomprehensible. If it were true, our ideas would be nothing but words. Nominalism thus understood would be nothing but a psittacism (Leibniz’s expression for empty speech, resembling that of a parrot), and would reduce the mind to a purely automatic role.” P. Janet, Traité de Philosophie, n. 160.

4 On Gilbert of Porreta, see Abbé Bertaud, Gilbert de la Porrée, Lib. Oudin. On the Nominalists, Gonzalez, Hist. de la Philosophie; Goubin, Œuvres inédites d’Abélard, introduction.

5 Cf. Met. Psych. Tract. I, q. II, a. 2.