On the Universals in particular

On genus. It has been said that genus is predicated in what incompletely, and does not constitute the complete essence; is genus, then, a part of the species?Response. 1° Genus is not an actual part of the species. An actual part is one which is contained actually under the whole; thus the hand is an actual part of the human body. But an actual part is not predicated of the whole — for we do not say “Man is a hand” or “a forearm.” But genus is rightly predicated of the species: Man is an animal. Therefore genus is not an actual part of the species.2° Genus is not an actual whole with respect to the species. An actual whole is that which contains actually and determinately its parts — as the human body actually comprises the hands, feet, etc. But genus does not contain actually and determinately everything that is in the species; for the species has many more elements and notes not included in the genus. Therefore.3° Genus is a potential whole with respect to the species. A potential whole with respect to the species is that which contains potentially and indeterminately what is actually and determinately in the species itself. But whatever is actually and determinately in the species can be found potentially and indeterminately in the genus. Therefore.The minor is explained. Rationality is actually in the human species; the genus of animal does not express this actually, but can extend itself toward it and can be contracted and determined by it. But if it can be determined by it, it contains it potentially and indeterminately.Likewise, animal does not actually contain the capacity to whinny, but can be contracted by it, and therefore carries it potentially. Therefore nothing is found actually in the species that is not contained potentially and in the extension of the genus. Genus is therefore a potential whole.4° Genus can, under different respects, be called both a potential part and a potential whole. If it is considered comparatively with respect to difference, genus explains one part and difference another — genus the determinable part, difference the determining part. Now the determinable part can rightly be called a potential part. But considered with respect to the inferior species, it is a potential whole, containing indeterminately what the species represents determinately, as has been explained.What it means that genus is taken from matter. Genus is compared to matter because each is potential and determinable. In first matter, however, no actuality is implied; in genus, however, a certain actuality is absorbed, though not perfectly determined. Hence genus is not to be taken from first matter alone, but from that which is material in the thing and is the principle of potentiality.In corporeal things, this principle is indeed derived from matter; in spiritual things — such as the angels — genus is not taken, even remotely, from matter (since they lack it), but from what is more potential and quasi-material in them. This is intellectuality taken in an indeterminate way. For finite and limited intellectuality, taken indeterminately, is something vague and common, which can be more or less perfect according as it more or less approaches pure act — that is, God. This commonness and indetermination of intellectuality, therefore, holds the place of genus; while greater or lesser approach to pure act holds the place of difference.

Accidents do not have matter intrinsic to themselves, but their matter is the subject — that is, substance; hence in accidents genus is derived from their diverse relation to substance: thus the genus of quantity is derived from the fact that quantity is an accident that extends substance into parts; the genus of quality from the fact that quality modifies substance in itself; etc.The proper differences of accidents, however, are unknown to us; hence we derive them either a priori from the subjects of which they are proper accidents, or from the object they regard, or a posteriori from the effects of accidents.On the multiple kinds of difference. Porphyry assigns three differences: common, proper, and most proper (propria, communis, propriissima). The common difference is one that arises from accidents; thus healthiness is a common difference by which a healthy person differs from a sick one; whiteness is a common difference by which a Gaul differs from an Ethiopian. The proper difference is one that arises from properties inseparable from the subject: risibility is a proper difference by which man is distinguished from a brute. The most proper difference (differentia propriissima) is one that pertains to the thing as something essential and constitutive: thus rationality is the most proper difference of man. This last alone is the one predicated in what kind of what. For the common difference pertains to the fifth predicable — accident; and the proper difference pertains to the fourth predicable.The most proper difference has a threefold office: 1° it is divisive — that is, it divides the genus into several species; 2° it is constitutive — that is, by determining the genus it constitutes the species; 3° it is distinctive — by constituting the species, it distinguishes it from every other.In what way difference is called universal. Difference has the character of a universal not by reference to the species, but by reference to the individuals contained under the species which it constitutes. For the universal is so called by reference to its correlative. But the correlatives of the universal are its inferiors, since the universal is one thing apt to be in many inferiors. Therefore it is called universal by reference to its inferiors.Now the species is not inferior to the difference, but equal to it and convertible with it. On the contrary, the individuals of the species are inferior both with respect to the species and with respect to the difference. Therefore difference is predicated formally of the individuals of the species, and concomitantly is predicated of the species as equal to equal. Hence rational is some universal, because it is predicated of all individuals of the human species, of which it is the constitutive difference.On species. Logical species and real species can be distinguished. Real species is one that results from genus and difference essentially united and forming one nature. Man is a real species, because matter and soul are essentially united. Logical species, however, is constituted from genus and difference accidentally united. White species and black species in men are logical species, because white and black are accidents of the human species.In what way species is called universal. Species has a twofold respect: 1° it is a certain subject that is contained under genus as an inferior under a superior; 2° it is a certain superior that regards individuals and is affirmed of them. Under the first respect it is called subjectable (subjicibilis); under the second it is called predicable (praedicabilis). Now it has the character of a universal not as it is subjectable, but as it is predicable. For the universal, as has been said, implies an order to inferiors as to its correlative. But species does not express an order to genus as to its inferior, but as to its superior. Therefore species is not called universal insofar as it is subjectable to genus, but insofar as it regards individuals which are its inferiors.Individual corresponds to species. As the name suggests, the individual is something undivided and indivisible. It can be defined as: a singular essence which cannot be communicated to others as to inferiors.A distinction is made: 1° vague individual, or individual in general — designated by such names as “an individual,” “a singular,” “some man,” etc.; 2° determinate individual — for example, Peter. To this individual especially belong the seven properties assigned above:“Forma, figura, locus, stirps, tempus, patria, nomen — Haec ea sunt septem quae non habet unus et alter.” (”Form, figure, place, lineage, time, homeland, name — these are the seven things that no two individuals share.”)3° Generic individual — that which expresses an order to genus: this animal; 4° specific individual — that which is immediately contained under the species: Paul; 5° substantial individual: this man; 6° accidental individual: this whiteness.On property. Property is said in four ways. First, what belongs to the species alone but not to every individual of it — to the species alone but not to all. To be a priest belongs to man alone, but not to every man. Second, what belongs to every individual but not to the species alone — to all but not to the species alone. To be bipedal belongs to every man, but not to man alone. Third, what belongs to the species alone and to every individual, but not always — to all, to the species alone, but not always. To laugh actually belongs to every man and to man alone, but not every man always actually laughs. Fourth, what belongs to the species alone and to every individual, and always — to all, to the species alone, always. To every man belongs being risible, to man alone, and always. And this is the property that constitutes the fourth predicable.For the property that constitutes the fourth predicable is predicated in what kind necessarily — that is, it is something inseparable from the essence. But what is inseparable from the essence is found only where the essence is — that is, in the species alone that has the essence; wherever the essence is — that is, in every individual that has the essence; and as long as the essence remains — that is, always.Property has the character of universal by reference to the individuals of the species. The universal implies an order to inferiors; but the species is not inferior to the property, for species and property are convertible — property extends only as far as the species. Therefore property is not called universal by reference to the species. Property does have its own inferiors — thus risibility regards this and that risibility; but of its inferiors it is predicated essentially, not in what kind. For property is a certain nature that is essentially divided into many individuals. Therefore property is not called universal with respect to its own inferiors, but with respect to the inferiors of the species, of which it is predicated in what kind necessarily.On accident. Accident is twofold: physical and logical. Physical accident is a being that cannot exist in itself but only in another — thus whiteness cannot subsist unless in some subject. Logical accident designates everything that is not of the essence of the thing or its property — thus pallor is not of the essence of man, nor a quality inseparable from the essence. Physical accident is called predicamental; logical accident is called predicable. More will be said about their distinction when we speak of the predicaments. Here a few words on predicable accident. It is defined by Porphyry as: that which can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject. It belongs to the subject in such a contingent way that it can be separated from it without any essential predicate perishing. Property, on the contrary, though not of the essence, nevertheless cannot be denied unless some predicate pertaining to the essence perishes. If I deny that risibility — which is the property of man — belongs to man, it immediately follows that the essence of man is not that from which risibility necessarily flows. But if the essence of man is not that from which risibility follows, the true essence of man no longer remains. Therefore property cannot be denied without some corruption resulting in the essence itself. Hence the axiom: The deletion of properties is the negation of the nature.When the predicable accident is separated — for example, whiteness from man — the same nature of man remains. The sense of the definition, however, is not that the accident can always in fact be really separated from the subject — since some accidents are naturally inseparable, like blackness from an Ethiopian — but the sense is: it can be affirmed or denied by the intellect indifferently, with the essence of the thing remaining intact. When blackness is separated by the intellect from the Ethiopian, his quiddity remains.Objection. Death is a predicable accident of man. But death cannot be present without the corruption of the subject. Therefore the given definition of accident is inept.Response. The major can be called into doubt. For death can be considered in two ways: either in becoming (in fieri) — at the moment when man approaches death — and then it does not destroy the essence of man; or in having come about (in facto esse) — when man is already dead — and then with respect to man it is a repugnant predicate, not a predicable accident. But granting the major, I distinguish the minor: death cannot be present without corruption of the subject as regards actual life, I concede; as regards the essential predicates of man, I deny. For whether men die or live, they have the same essential predicates. Actual life, however, is not of the essence of man, but a contingent predicate.It is to be noted finally that the words without the corruption of the subject properly signify: without the corruption of the species — not: without the corruption of the individual. Often indeed an accident can be separated without the corruption of the individual; but it can happen that an individual depends on certain accidents for its preservation.Accident has the character of universal by reference to the subjects it denominates, not by reference to its own proper inferiors. As we said of property, accident has its own inferiors — for whiteness is divided into this and that whiteness. But with respect to its own inferiors it is predicated essentially — as in the predication: This white thing is white. Therefore it is called universal with respect to those of which it is predicated in what kind contingently, and these are the subjects it denominates — e.g., Paul is white, John is white, etc.