ON TRANSCENDENTALS AND UNIVERSALS

On transcendentals. Having explained the notion of univocal and analogical, we must now treat of the principal analogical and univocal concepts — namely, the Transcendentals and the Universals. A transcendental is said to be that which is above every genus and every species. It is defined as: that which belongs, at least in some way, to all and each of the things that are or can be. Six transcendentals are enumerated: thing (res), being (ens), one (unum), something (aliquid), true (verum), good (bonum).Thing designates the subject which has being; being, the concrete subject — that is, both that which has being and the being itself. Every being is undivided in itself, from which it is one; and divided from everything else, in which respect it is called something (aliquid), as if “another what” (aliud quid); and it has an order to the intellect, from which it is true, and to the will, from which it is good.In practice, thing and being are used interchangeably; and although something designates being as divided from the rest, it is nonetheless reduced to being or to one. There are therefore six terms, but only four transcendentals are commonly assigned: being, one, true, good. These are treated at length in Metaphysics¹. Universal. The universal is defined as: one thing apt to be in many and to be predicated of them univocally. There are two very great differences between universals and transcendentals. 1° Transcendentals are in all species and genera, but are not contained by them; they are both within and beyond the genera, within and beyond every category. Universals, however, designate a determinate genus and species, which belong to some things and not to others; they are reducible to the categories and cannot range beyond every category. 2° Transcendentals are predicated only analogically of their inferiors — in which way being is predicated analogically of God and creatures, of substance and accident; for being belongs to God essentially and necessarily, but to a creature contingently; it belongs to substance as to that which properly exists — that is, exists in itself; but it belongs to accident as to something that exists only in another, whence an accident rather “inheres” than “is.” Universals, on the contrary, are predicated of their inferiors univocally; thus genus belongs in the same way to all and each of the things that participate in the genus, and similarly the human species is attributed in the same way to individual humans. Direct and reflex universal. In the concept of a universal — for example, in “man” — one can consider the very nature expressed through the definition, with regard to its constitutive notes, without caring whether it is in many things or not. A universal taken in this way is called metaphysical or direct, because it pertains to the direct consideration of the mind. Furthermore, the mind can reflect and consider nature — not now with regard to its constitutive principles, but reduplicatively as communicable to many. This mode of being in many — this communicability to many — is called the logical or reflex universal. It is this universal with which we are presently concerned. Predicables. By the very fact that some nature is communicable to many, it can be predicated of many (here predication is understood as the affirmation of one thing of another). Hence universals are rightly called predicables (κατηγορούμενα — kategoroumena, “those which are predicated”). Predicables, therefore, are the universal modes of predicating that are grounded in the very communicability to many. Immediately and directly, the predicable signifies the logical universal itself; but since the logical universal supposes the metaphysical universal as its foundation, the predicable mediately and connotatively implies the very nature expressed through the definition. The number of predicables is five. Argument I. Predicables are the general modes by which one thing can be communicated to many. But there are five general modes by which one thing can be communicated to many. For one thing can be in many either as something pertaining to the essence, or as something supervening upon the essence. In the first case: it either explains the whole and complete essence — namely, everything that enters into the definition — and thus we have species; or it explains the potential and determinable part of the essence by which the thing agrees with others — and this is called genus; or the actualizing and determining part by which the thing is distinguished from others — and this is difference. In the second case: either it is something arising from the principles of the essence and having a necessary connection with them — and this is called property (proprium); or it is something not having a necessary connection with the principles of the essence — and this is called accident.Argument II. There must be a certain analogy between the logical composite and the natural composite. But in the natural composite there are five things: 1° matter, as the potential and determinable element; 2° form, as the actualizing and determining element; 3° from matter and form results the composite; 4° from the composite result the properties; 5° finally, accidents belong to the composite. Therefore in the logical composite also there must be found something that is quasi-matter — and this is genus, which is indeterminate and determinable; something quasi-form — and this is difference, which actualizes and determines; something quasi-composite — and this is species, which results from genus and difference; and finally properties and accidents.The comparison, however, must not be pressed too far. For the physical composite is constituted by really distinct parts, while the logical composite is constituted according to the intentions of reason, which do not necessarily imply a real distinction. Definition and explanation of the predicables. Genus is defined by Porphyry and the Scholastics as: one thing apt to be in many that differ in species and to be predicated of them univocally in what (in quid) incompletely.In this definition, four things are to be noted. 1° What is common to every predicable: one thing apt to be in many — and by the very fact that it is communicable to many, it can be predicated of many, and indeed univocally, in which respect it is distinguished from the transcendentals, which are predicated only analogically. 2° Many that differ in species. For genus is the common and determinable part in which species agree and which is divided into species by differences. It is predicated directly and immediately only of species; if it is ever predicated of an individual, this is by means of the species. For the predication “Peter is an animal” is explained as follows: Peter is a man; man is an animal; therefore Peter is an animal. 3° In what (in quid), that is, in the manner by which one responds to the question: What is the thing? Now that by which one responds to the question “What is the thing?” is the essence, which for this reason is called the quiddity. To predicate in what, therefore, is to predicate essentially, and also in a substantive manner. Now genus is an essential part of the thing; for when I say “Man is an animal,” I assign something without which the essence of man cannot be conceived. Genus is also predicated substantively; for to assign the genus of man, one must say not “Man is of an animal” but “Man is an animal.” 4° Incompletely. For although genus pertains to the essence, it is only its potential part; for as long as we have only “animal,” we understand neither the essence of man nor the essence of horse.Species is defined as: one thing apt to be in many that differ in number and to be predicated of them univocally in what completely.Four things can also be noted here. 1° What is common to the other predicables: to be in many, to be predicated univocally. 2° Species is predicated in what — that is, essentially, or as constituting the essence. 3° Completely, because it expresses the whole essence. For species explains and defines the thing completely; hence if I wish to know the complete essence, it suffices to know the definition of the species. 4° Many that differ in number. Just as genus designates what is common in which species agree, so species designates what is common in which individuals agree.Difference is defined as: one thing apt to be in many and to be predicated of them univocally in what kind of what (in quale quid).1° Difference, like the other predicables, is said univocally of many. 2° In what (in quid), or essentially. For difference is that by which natures which agree in one genus are essentially distinguished from one another. But they cannot be essentially distinguished unless difference is predicated essentially. 3° Nevertheless, one must not concede that difference is predicated in what absolutely, but in what kind of what (in quale quid). To predicate in what kind (in quale) is to predicate in that by which one responds to the question: Of what kind is the thing? — What kind is Peter? The answer is: rational. Hence to predicate in what kind is to predicate in an adjectival manner.Difference, however, although it is essential, exercises the office and predication of difference by way of adjacency — not in the manner of a substantive. The reason is that difference does not provide the first foundation of the essence, but comes to genus and presupposes it as something already in place, which it then actualizes and determines into species. Therefore, since genus stands in the manner of a foundation, it is predicated in a substantive manner; and since difference comes to this foundation, it is predicated by way of adjacency, in an adjectival manner — that is, in what kind. Therefore in what kind of what (in quale quid) means: predicated in an adjectival manner, essentially² (1).Property (proprium) is defined as: one thing apt to be in many and to be predicated of them univocally in what kind necessarily.1° It is predicated univocally of many subjects — namely, of all the inferiors contained under the species of which it is the property. Peter is risible; Paul is risible; and so for all the others contained under the human species, of which risibility is the property. 2° Property does not pertain to the essence of the thing — in this it is distinguished from the three preceding predicables — because it is attributed in the manner of a quality. 3° Yet of a necessary quality, inseparable from the subject — as risibility necessarily accompanies man: in what kind necessarily.Accident is defined as: one thing apt to be in many and to be predicated of them univocally in what kind contingently.1° It agrees with all predicables in that it is predicated univocally of many. 2° It differs from genus, species, and difference in that it is predicated only in what kind. 3° It differs from property in that property implies a necessary quality, while accident implies something separable from the subject, which can indifferently be present or absent.Definition of predicables in the abstract. The above definitions are of the concrete universal. Now the concrete implies simultaneously both the form and the subject: the form directly and formally, the subject materially and by way of substrate. Hence the concrete universal signifies directly and formally the state of universality, and materially and by way of substrate the very nature which has the state of universality.In the abstract, however, the predicables can be defined as follows: Genus is the universality of a potential nature common to many differing in species. Species is the universality of a complete nature. Difference is the universality of the distinctive nature of species. Property is the universality of an accidental notion necessarily following upon the essence. Accident is the universality of an accidental notion contingently belonging to a subject. Question: Whether it is necessary for a universal to actually be in many. In the definition of predicables we place: one thing apt to be in many. It belongs to the nature of the universal, therefore, to be able to be communicated to many according to our manner of conceiving. But can there be some universal that is not actually in many but only in one? Conclusion: There cannot be a genus having a single species; but there can indeed be a species having a single individual. So St. Thomas and the Thomists.Proof of the first part. Genus designates a common, potential, and indeterminate nature. But commonness cannot be preserved with respect to only one thing — for what is potential necessarily requires many, since in one thing it fulfills only one part of its potentiality; and what is indeterminate must be contracted by diverse differences; diverse differences, moreover, introduce diverse species. Therefore genus cannot be preserved with respect to a single species. Hence the axiom: Genus must be referred to several species.Proof of the second part. Species designates an actual and determinate nature. Now nothing prevents an actual and determinate nature from being found in a single individual. Thus the entire human nature is found in one man. Therefore species can be preserved in a single individual.Objection. Just as the whole human nature is contained in one man, so the whole nature of animal is contained in a single species. Therefore genus can be preserved in a single species.Response. I deny the parity. Genus is indeed preserved in a single species with respect to the entity of the nature itself, but not with respect to the formal character of genus as such. For the common character of genus is potentiality, which requires many. On the contrary, the character of species signifies something actual, which can indeed be had in one thing — and in fact is. Whether a species having a single individual can be called universal. According to St. Thomas, there neither exists nor can exist more than one individual in each species of the angels, and hence there are as many species as there are angels. The Scholastics ask, however, whether the angelic species can be called universal.There would be no difficulty if the angelic nature could be communicated to many, even though in fact it were in only one; but it is repugnant to it to be communicated to many. Nevertheless, it must be said that the angelic nature is universal.Proof. That nature is universal which, as far as it is in itself, can be communicated to many. But the angelic nature, as far as it is in itself, is communicable to many. Therefore it is universal.Explanation of the minor. The angelic nature is not prevented from being in many because it is a nature of such an order of things, but because there is lacking in the angel the principle of numerical multiplication, which is designated matter. If, therefore, the nature cannot be in many, this is not due to a defect in itself, but to a defect in the principle of individuation — or a defect in the receiving subject.The nature, therefore, as far as it is in itself, is communicable to many; but the communicability is impeded on the part of those to whom the communication would have to be made. Such a nature, therefore, is rightly called universal. So the Thomists commonly hold. How universals are to be expressed. First rule. Difference, property, and accident, when applied to their inferiors, are to be expressed in the concrete. Peter is rational — not rationality; he is white — not whiteness. The reason is clear. These three universals are predicated in what kind, that is, in an adjectival manner. But every adjective is concrete, for it implies both the form and the subject of the form — as virtuous denotes both virtue and the subject of virtue. Therefore these three universals are predicated in the concrete.Second rule. Genus and species, when predicated of substances, are to be expressed in the concrete. For they must be expressed as essences complete in their order. But substances in the abstract are not complete in the order of substance, since they are considered separated from their supposita; thus humanity in the abstract cannot be called a complete substance, since it is not something subsistent. Therefore they must be expressed in the concrete. Hence one must say: Man is an animal — not: Humanity is animality; Peter is a man — not: Peterhood is humanity.Third rule. Genus and species, when predicated of accidents, are to be expressed in the abstract. For only what is of the essence of the accident is to be expressed, not what is extraneous to it. But the nature expressed in the abstract designates the pure essence of the accident; expressed in the concrete, it absorbs something extraneous to the essence. For in saying virtue, I designate the essence alone; but in saying virtuous, I add something extraneous — namely, the subject — which is not of the essence of the accident. Therefore the predication should be made in the abstract — for example, by saying: science is certain and evident knowledge — not: the one knowing is one who cognizes.

1Metaphysics — Ontology, Tractates I and II.

2From John of St. Thomas, Logic.