Univocals, Analogicals, etc

On univocals. The principal division of the distributive concept is into univocal and analogical. Since this division is of the greatest importance in philosophy, we must now treat more fully of univocals and analogicals. Univocal terms (synonyma) are those whose name is common and whose meaning signified by the name is simply the same: Peter is a man, Paul is a man — here the name is common to both, and the nature signified by the name is simply the same in Peter and Paul. This meaning can be the same either according to species, as in this example, or according to genus only: Peter is an animal, the ox is an animal. Analogicals. Analogical terms are those whose name is common and whose meaning signified by the name is neither simply diverse nor simply the same, but implies a certain proportion or similarity. A healthy animal; healthy food. There the name is common, but the meaning signified by the name — healthiness — is not simply the same in the animal and in the food, nor simply diverse; there is indeed a certain proportion, for healthiness is in the animal as in its subject, but in the food as in its cause. In this example, therefore, the proper definition of analogy is verified. Division of analogy. Although authors agree on the matter, they do not use the terms in the same sense; for not a few take the analogical of proportion and the analogical of attribution as the same thing, while some distinguish them. We, however, for the sake of clarity, distinguish a threefold analogy: of proportion, of attribution, and of proportionality.Analogy of proportion is had when the meaning signified by the name is found in one thing intrinsically and essentially, but in another extrinsically, secondarily, and by reference to the first. Healthiness is in an animal intrinsically and essentially; but in food only extrinsically, secondarily, and by reference to the animal. Analogy of attribution, however, is when the thing signified by the name is said of several things in relation to some third thing. Healthy food; healthy color. If we attribute healthiness to food and to color, this is not because healthiness is found principally in food and in color by reference to food; rather, both color and food are called healthy because each has an order to some third thing in which healthiness is properly found — namely, the animal: food is called healthy as the cause of health, and color is called healthy as the sign of health.In analogy of attribution there are always at least three terms: two that are compared with each other — as food and color — and a third in relation to which the comparison is made — as animal in this example. In analogy of proportion, however, there are only two terms: one in which the signified meaning is found properly and intrinsically, and another in which the meaning is found extrinsically, secondarily, and by reference to the first.The principal analogate is that in which the signified meaning is found intrinsically and essentially, and in relation to which the others are named. It is also called the more famous and primary analogate.Some examples of each analogy: the divine essence, holy scripture — this is analogy of proportion, because divinity is in the essence of God intrinsically, but in scripture extrinsically. Holy scripture, the divine word — this is analogy of attribution, for both scripture and word are called divine in relation to a third thing, namely the divine essence.The priestly soul, priestly vestments — analogy of proportion: for priesthood is intrinsically in the soul, but extrinsically in the vestment. Priestly vestments, priestly prayer — analogy of attribution: vestment and prayer are called priestly in relation to a third thing.Proportionality implies a proportion of proportions. Hence analogicals of proportionality are defined as: those whose name is common, but whose signified meaning is the same according to a conformity of proportions. In this way, six and four are analogicals: for six is to three as four is to two — just as six is the double of three, so four is the double of two. Likewise in this manner, the foot of a man and the foot of a mountain are analogicals, because the foot of the mountain is to the mountain what the foot of a man is to the man. Analogy of proportionality is divided into proper and metaphorical. Proper analogy of proportionality is when the meaning signified by the name is found in each analogate formally and truly, though not in simply the same way — as being is found properly in substance and in accident. For although the being of substance and the being of accident are said according to a conformity of proportions, substance is nonetheless properly and intrinsically a being, and accident is properly and intrinsically a being. Metaphorical analogy of proportionality is when the signified meaning is found formally in one thing and by way of likeness or transference in another — as laughter is formally in man, but metaphorically in a meadow; as the eye is formally in the body, but by transference in the soul. This analogy, although it has a foundation in nature, arises principally from the usage and convention of men. Such things are not natural and properly called analogates, but are called by Cajetan “abusive analogates”¹. Conditions of analogicals. The analogicals of proportion or attribution have four conditions. The first is that the form be found intrinsically in the principal analogate, but in the others extrinsically and by denomination — as we said of healthiness, which is intrinsically in the animal but denominatively in color. The reason for this condition is clear. If the form is intrinsic in all things, it is either altogether similar in all — and then it will be univocal — or altogether diverse — and it will be equivocal — or it is intrinsic in all but only according to a conformity of proportions — and it will be analogy of proportionality. Therefore, for there to be analogy distinct from analogy of proportionality, it is required that the form be intrinsic in one and extrinsic in the others. The second condition, which follows from the first, is that the analogical form be numerically one, since it is found only in the principal analogate. The third condition is that the form of the principal analogate be placed in the definition of the others; for the others are denominated from the principal — so the meaning of healthiness in food cannot be understood unless one first knows what healthiness is in the animal. The fourth is that the principal analogate and the other analogates do not have one single objective concept. For the concept must correspond to the form. But analogates of this kind do not have one form that is intrinsic in all of them; their unity is the unity of the order of one or several things to one term from which they are denominated. Therefore they cannot have one single objective concept — hence the concept of healthiness is properly completed only in the animal. There are therefore diverse concepts for the diverse analogates. Yet a certain unity of comparison to one term is found, and this is what distinguishes them from equivocals, in which such unity of comparison is lacking.In metaphorical analogicals of proportionality, similar conditions are present. It is manifest that laughter is not intrinsically in man and in the meadow, nor do the laughter of man and the laughter of the meadow have one and the same objective concept. The analogy of proportionality properly so called, however, has three entirely different conditions, expressed as follows. The first: the form of the analogicals is found intrinsically in the principal analogate, and also intrinsically in the others — though not in the same way. For these analogicals must be distinguished from the analogicals of proportion and attribution, and from univocals. They are distinguished from the former because in those the form is found intrinsically only in the principal analogate; they are distinguished from univocals because the form is not found in all in the same way. Thus the form of being is intrinsically in substance and in accident, yet not in the same way — since substance is being in itself, while accident is being in another. The second condition follows from the first: the principal analogate need not be placed in the definition of the others — for these have the form by which they are intrinsically denominated. The third: these analogates can have one concept with an imperfect unity. The reason is clear. The concept is measured by the form it represents. But these analogicals have one intrinsic form. Therefore they have one concept. Yet because the form is not in all according to the same mode, the concept will not be one with a perfect unity, but one with a qualified unity. The manner of speaking of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor distinguishes²: 1° Analogicals according to intention and not according to being. These are the analogicals of proportion and attribution; the form is found in all according to intention — that is, denominatively and extrinsically — but not according to being — that is, not intrinsically. 2° Analogicals according to intention and according to being. These are the analogicals of proportionality properly so called. The form is found in all according to being — that is, intrinsically — and moreover according to intention, because the form is not in all according to the same way. 3° Analogicals according to being and not according to intention. These are called by Cajetan and others analogicals of inequality, but they are not properly analogicals. This analogy is had when the signified meaning is predicated univocally of all, but the being is more perfect in one than in another. I say: a corruptible body is a body; an incorruptible body is a body. The name “body” is predicated univocally of a corruptible body and of an incorruptible body, but the being of the nature is not of the same account in corruptible and incorruptible things. If these are considered physically and according to being, they can be called analogicals, because corruptible matter and incorruptible matter is neither simply the same nor simply diverse; but if they are considered logically and according to intention, the definition of analogicals does not apply to them, but rather that of univocals — because a corruptible body and an incorruptible body have the same account of body; for each designates a composite of matter and form. Hence such things are not counted among the properly so called analogicals. On equivocals. Equivocal terms (homonyma) are those whose name is common and whose signified meaning is simply diverse. Thus the name “dog” (canis) is said of a star, of a fish, and of a domestic animal — things that are simply disparate. Sometimes equivocation is by chance (a casu), as in the example just given; sometimes it is by design (a consilio), when a sharing of the same name comes about through some deliberate consideration — as when someone names his son Dominic because he hopes he will one day enter the Order of St. Dominic. The Latins also call the analogical term itself an equivocal by design (aequivocum a consilio), as has been said.Equivocation belongs to words alone, for an idea — like any image — represents one object in such a way that it cannot be representative of another. On denominatives. Denominative terms (paronyma) are accidental concrete terms, insofar as they are denominated from the form they signify and attribute this denomination to a subject. Thus “grammarian” is denominated from grammar, “brave” from bravery, “white” from whiteness. Because denominatives are accidental, it follows that to predicate denominatively is to predicate accidentally. Scholion on the causes of analogy. Having explained the notions of univocals, analogicals, equivocals, and denominatives, some things must be added on the causes of analogy. Suárez holds that dependence alone is the cause of analogy; others hold that transcendence alone is the cause; the Thomists, however, posit both.First of all, dependence in participating some common meaning is a sufficient cause of analogy. For such dependence is the order of prior and posterior in participating a common meaning. But the order of prior and posterior in participating a common meaning is a sufficient cause of analogy. Therefore.Proof of the minor. Analogy is had when some common meaning is found in one thing primarily and principally, but in the others only in a qualified sense. But the order of prior and posterior in participating some common meaning necessarily brings it about that the meaning is in one thing primarily — and hence principally — and in the others subsequently — that is, in a secondary and qualified manner. Therefore the order of prior and posterior in participating some common meaning induces analogy. Hence the Angelic Doctor³ concludes to the analogy between God and creature from the dependence of the creature upon God, who is being by essence.Second, transcendence is also a sufficient cause of analogy. Transcendence is a common meaning that is outside every genus and difference and is absorbed into every concept — such as the meaning of being. Now this common meaning causes analogy. For analogy implies that several things have a meaning that is neither simply the same nor simply diverse, but agrees in something and differs in something. But by virtue of transcendence, the inferiors agree in something — namely, in that common meaning which is absorbed into every concept — and differ in something, for that common meaning is not contracted in the same way by all. Thus the meaning of being is participated in differently by God — who is being by essence — and by the creature — which is being from another; by substance — which is being in itself and properly existing — and by accident — which is being of being, or being in another. Therefore transcendence implies and causes analogy.Analogy of attribution and proportion is caused by dependence, for this analogy obtains among several things that are denominated by a form which is in one primarily, and in the others by dependence upon that prior. Analogy of metaphorical proportionality is also caused by dependence, for the analogical form is in one thing intrinsically, but in another extrinsically and by dependence upon the prior.Analogy of proportionality properly so called, however, can be caused both by transcendence — as has just been shown regarding the meaning of being — and by dependence, when the analogical form in one thing depends upon another, as the meaning of being in accident depends upon substance.

1Cf. CAJETAN, Opusc. de analogia nominum and commentary on I P., q. 13, a. 5.

2Dist. 19, q. 5, 2; I, D. 30, 4.

3I P., q. 14, art. III, ad 3.