What st. alphonsus says about kissing outside of marriage

413. ANSWER. In order to discern this matter, a distinction must first be drawn between venereal intention and pleasure and the intention and pleasure of the senses — the latter consisting in a certain proportion and conformity of the thing touched with the organ of touch. It must further be known that venereal intention and sensation are mortal and exclude one from the kingdom of heaven, according to the Apostle in Galatians 5. We now approach with difficulty the treatment of that subject whose very name infects the minds of men. I ask the chaste reader to pardon me if he finds here several questions and circumstances omitted by Fr. Busenbaum, but discussed and explained in this place. Would that I could have explained them more briefly or obscurely! But since this is the most frequent and abundant matter of confessions, and the one on account of which the greatest number of souls descend into hell (indeed, I do not hesitate to assert that on account of this single vice of immodesty — or at least not without it — all who are damned are damned), it was therefore necessary for me, for the instruction of those who wish to learn moral science, to explain myself clearly, though as chastely as could be done, and to discuss very many particular cases. I earnestly ask, however, that students who are preparing themselves for the office of hearing confessions should not read this treatise on the sixth commandment — just as also the other treatise on the conjugal debt — until they are already close to hearing confessions; and that they read it for this sole purpose, setting aside all curiosity whatsoever; and that during that time they lift their minds frequently to God and commend themselves to the Immaculate Virgin, lest while they labor to win the souls of others for God, they themselves suffer harm to their own.

414. Although under this commandment "thou shalt not commit adultery" only adultery is explicitly expressed — which is what the Greek word moicheia properly signifies — nevertheless every venereal act outside of marriage is forbidden by the same commandment. See the Salamancans, on the sixth precept, chapter 1, no. 3, who prove this at length with St. Augustine and St. Ambrose. For although fornication is a lesser evil than adultery, nevertheless, because by the law of nature carnal union is ordained only for marriage, through which offspring may not only be begotten but also well educated, God therefore in this commandment forbade all sexual intercourse outside of marriage and likewise all venereal acts, because they are not ordained toward generation. Furthermore, fornication is found to have been expressly forbidden by God elsewhere, as in Leviticus 19:29, Deuteronomy 23:17, and 1 Corinthians 6:9.

415. i. Kisses, embraces, pressings of hands, and similar acts, if done outside of marriage with the intention of a lustful act or for the sake of venereal pleasure — even if not that perfect pleasure which consists in emission of seed — are nevertheless always mortal sins; because in that spirit they are immodest outside of marriage, and by their nature such pleasure tends toward the perfect act. Filliucius, vol. 50, chapter 9, no. 294; Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, disputation 8; Sanchez, book 9, disputation 46. It is asked whether in the genus of lust there is parvity of matter. It must be noted that theologians distinguish venereal or carnal pleasure — that is, with arousal of the vital spirits serving generation — from sensitive or natural pleasure. Hence two doubts are debated. Doubt I is: whether there is parvity of matter in venereal matters. Sanchez, on marriage, book 9, disputation 46, no. 9, setting aside the danger of pollution or consent to a carnal act, holds that there is parvity of matter — as would be the case with touching a woman's hand or foot, pressing her arm, pinching her, or twisting her fingers. And the same is held by Navarrus, Soto, Salas, and several others cited by the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 79. Tamburini, Decalogus on immodesty, chapter 8, §1, nos. 8 and 9, also appears to hold the same. But Tamburini proceeds by a different route: he distinguishes, together with Palaus (who calls this opinion most common), and says that there is indeed no parvity of matter in venereal matters — in which any small pleasure is gravely evil — but that there is nonetheless parvity of matter in the subject matter of lust as it extends more broadly to the senses of touch. Hence he says that a light touch out of playfulness or with pleasure that is not venereal does not exceed venial sin. Notwithstanding all these opinions, it must be held absolutely, with Viva, in his scrutiny of proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, and with the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 81, and Moya and Corella, that every carnal or lustful pleasure taken with advertence and deliberation is a mortal sin — especially after the aforementioned proposition 40, which stated: It is a probable opinion that a kiss engaged in for the sake of carnal and sensible pleasure arising from the kiss is only a venial sin, setting aside the danger of further consent and pollution. For if in kisses there is no light matter, neither is there to be granted in other touches accompanied by carnal pleasure. The reason is that any carnal pleasure, or any arousal of the vital spirits serving generation, is a kind of inchoate pollution or movement toward pollution. Tournely, Continuation, vol. 3, p. 526, conclusion 2, and the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 65, together with Cajetan, Bonacina, Tamburini, and Lopez, therefore rightly condemn the acts described above — namely, pinching a woman's hand, twisting her fingers, etc. — as mortal sins, on account of the carnal pleasure that is present on such occasions, or at least on account of the proximate danger thereof. And De la Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 911, likewise rightly rejects the opinion of Arriaga, who says that one who voluntarily consents to such slight carnal movements occurring spontaneously does not sin gravely. 416. Doubt II is: whether there is parvity of matter in sensible or natural pleasure — namely, if someone takes pleasure in the touch of a woman's hand, as in the touch of something soft, such as a rose, silk cloth, or the like. The first opinion affirms this, with St. Antoninus, Silvester, Salas, Navarrus, Filliucius, Hurtado, Moya, and many others cited by the Salamancans, chapter 1, no. 36; and Busenbaum below, no. 4, and Tournely, vol. 3, p. 516, conclusion 7, together with Comitolus, Baronius, Silvester, and others adhere to this. The second opinion, however, denies it, with Cajetan, Diana, and others cited by the Salamancans, no. 40, at the end. The reason is that touches, insofar as they are pleasurable according to the sense of touch of a girl or young person, are by their nature ordained toward pollution. And this I consider must be held absolutely — since the Salamancans, no. 48, together with Filliucius, Trullench, Diana, and Roncaglia, on the sixth precept, chapter 1, question 2, rightly say that the first opinion is not practically probable, because on account of corrupt nature it is morally impossible to have that natural pleasure without also feeling carnal and venereal pleasure — especially in persons capable of intercourse, and especially if these acts are engaged in with some affection and lingering, as Elb., on the sixth precept, no. 186, rightly observes. Hence Sporer, on marriage, chapter 3, no. 687, together with Sanchez, book 9, disputation 49, and the common opinion, and De la Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 804, rightly say that as a general rule the first opinion is not practically probable — because it is in itself a mortal sin to expose oneself to the danger of consenting to venereal pleasure. De la Croix, however, makes an exception for someone in whom such proximate danger would be absent. I would admit this only, with Fr. Holzmann, on the sixth precept, chapter 2, no. 706, in the rare case where someone, through long experience, was morally certain that no danger of consent threatened him — but when will such a case occur? It must be noted, however, that there is a difference — as Tournely, vol. 3, p. 570, at the beginning, rightly distinguishes — between acting for the sake of taking pleasure and acting with the pleasure that arises from qualities attached to bodies. In the latter case, parvity of matter can well exist, if the pleasure is merely sensible or natural; provided — it must be added — that you do not rest in it, but in the act itself detest the pleasure; otherwise you would not be acting with pleasure but for the sake of pleasure, which cannot fail to be inseparable from the danger of falling into venereal pleasure. ii. Such acts are of the same nature as perfect or consummated acts; and therefore in confession it must be explained whether they were engaged in with a person of the same or opposite sex, with a free or married person, a relative, a consecrated person, etc. Lessius, disputation 15; Sanchez, book 1, chapter 2.

417. iii. Kisses, embraces, pressings of hands, and similar non-obscene acts, if done only out of duty (as St. Thomas, 2.2, question 15, article 4, states), or out of the custom of one's country, or for the sake of decent courtesy or the increase of goodwill — even if venereal pleasure incidentally arises (provided consent is not given to it) — are not sins. Lessius; Filliucius, loc. cit., no. 171. (So holds the common opinion: St. Antoninus, part 2, title 5, chapter 1, §10, and Tournely, vol. 3, p. 505, with Silvester, response v, to 1.) De la Croix, however, rightly notes, book 3, part 1, no. 900, that kisses engaged in even by the custom of one's country are ordinarily mortal sins if engaged in with lingering or ardor. He says the same, together with Sporer, of kisses on the mouth or of one receiving another's tongue with the mouth. He observes on the other hand, with Sanchez, etc., no. 902, that to kiss children (understood of very young children), even with sensible pleasure, is ordinarily no more than venial, because that pleasure is ordinarily nothing more than natural.

418. iv. But if these acts are done out of some venial vanity, playfulness, curiosity, levity, wantonness, or even out of sensuality or a sensual and natural affection (provided they are not done with venereal pleasure nor for its sake, and if such pleasure should arise unexpectedly and contrary to intention, it is repelled, and the acts are then avoided), they do not exceed venial sin. See Filliucius here; Lessius; Sanchez, loc. cit.; Diana, part 4, tract 3, response 136. The contrary, however, is safer. See Trullench, book 6, chapter 1, disputation 12, no. 8. (But see what was said at no. 416.)

430. xi. An unmarried person who permits herself to be touched by another with a touch that is commonly regarded as decent — such as taking of hands, handling of the hand, embraces, and kisses according to the custom of one's country — does not sin unless it is clear to her that it is being done with a wicked affection; for it is not lawful to cooperate with that. Filliucius teaches, however, that even then it can be admitted so that the one who is touching may not be defamed (or so that suspicion of infamy may not be introduced, or that others may not be scandalized — so Tournely, vol. 3, p. 505, with Silvester, and the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 62, with Sa, Azor, Cajetan, and Bonacina). She is obliged, however, to resist if the touches are done secretly and it is certain that they are done maliciously. Salamancans, ibid.; Tamburini, §4, no. 25; De la Croix, book 2, no. 249. One who admits immodest touches (such as of the breasts and shameful parts) or furtive kisses (as the Salamancans, ibid., no. 22, also say) — and lingering or indecent ones — sins, because a wicked affection is presumed. See Filliucius, book 30, no. 169, and below, book 5, chapter 1, doubt 2. Whether, moreover, a woman who is overcome by force is obliged to cry out, in order to avoid the immodest touches of another if need be — the Salamancans, ibid., together with Cajetan, from the common opinion as they assert, affirm this, and prove it from Deuteronomy 22:23-24, where a girl is condemned to death because she did not cry out, being within the city. But Navarrus, Summa, chapter 16, no. 1; Soto, on justice, book 5, question 1, article 5; and Bonacina, on the fourth precept, single question, no. 10, together with Reginaldus, very probably say that a woman is not obliged to cry out when there is the danger of notable harm or infamy or excessive shame — because in that case, if she otherwise resists as much as she can, she is not obliged to repel the force at such great cost to herself. Exception must be made if there is a proximate danger of consenting. Nor does the text of Deuteronomy cited above stand in the way; for that precept was a judicial precept pertaining indeed to the external forum, in which a girl who had been violated and had not cried out while in the city was ordered to be condemned — because it was presumed (as commented by a Lapide) that she had consented to the violation and therefore had not cried out. And Menochius and Gordon, with Philo, as cited by Calmet on the cited text, hold the same. Furthermore, no one doubts that all the judicial precepts of the old law have now altogether ceased, superseded by the more perfect judicial precepts of the evangelical law, as the learned Frassen proves, vol. 6, on law, disputation 3, article 2, question 4, conclusion 1, at the end. It must not be denied, however, that if a woman is in proximate danger of consenting to intercourse — on account of past experience or on account of her known weakness — she is indeed obliged to cry out in order to free herself from that encounter. Whether, moreover, a woman who is overcome by force is obliged rather to suffer death, by repelling with force the aggressor against her chastity, than to permit intercourse — there are two opinions on this, as we said at no. 368. But the negative opinion, held by Soto, Navarrus, Toledo, and others, is probable speculatively rather than practically.