On Free Will

freedom in general:

Will desires certain things of necessity; but the fundamental question on which the whole root of the morality of human acts depends is if the will wills of necessity whatever it wills or not that is whether man enjoys freedom of will. The term freedom implies a certain immunity. Ergo freedom is understood in a plethora of ways

1. freedom of nature

2. freedom of grace = immunity from sin

3. freedom of glory = immunity from misery

In the current context im speaking of freedom of nature. This is immunity from coercion and from absolute necessity that is it excludes determination to one things after the manner of nature, by which natural agents operate, and it implies a true power with respect to opposites. This power can be either with respect to acts contrarily opposed (v.g. love or hate) or with respect to an act and its negation or cessation (v.g. willing or not willing, acting or not acting). In the former case its called freedom of specification or of contrariety; in the latter its called freedom of contradiction or of exercise. Either way it implies that the will has full dominion of its own act.

proper definition of freedom:

Freedom is defined by St. Thomas as the elective power of means, the order of the end being preserved. Its called

1. a power, a potency, or faculty. For free will is the principle of a free act. Now the principle of an act is either a habit or a power. Now free will isnt a habit: not an acquired habit, since its something implanted in all; nor a natural habit, for with respect to those things concerning which we have natural habits, we are naturally inclined as toward assenting to first principles; but those things toward which we are naturally inclined dont fall under free will. Ergo its a power.

2. elective, meaning it enjoys the power of receiving one thing whilst rejecting another. Now the choice is the appetite following deliberation and belongs at once to the intellect and to the appetite. St. thomas in q. 83, a. 3 says:

> “On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.”

Choice nonetheless belongs formally and electively to the will. For the object of choice is assigned as that which is ordered to the end and which has the character of the useful good. But the good as such is the object of the will. Ergo choice is from the will formally although presuppositively from reason. Free will ergo which is the elective power can be called the faculty of the will and of reason: of the will formally, of reason originatively and regulatively.

3. of means, because concerning the end as end, theres no choice nor freedom; rather its established that the will necessarily desires the end and beatitude in general. For freedom stands to the will as reason stands to the intellect. Just as the intellect is concerned with those things which are known without comparison or discourse, so the will is concerned with those things which are desired for their own sake. Now the things which are known through themselves are first principles, and that which is desired for its own sake is the end. Th intellect, then is concerned with the first principles and the will with the ultimate end. Reason however is concerned with those things which arent evident through themselves but are deduced from others by argumentation: for to reason is properly to arrive from one thing at knowledge of another. Similarly, choice and freedom concern those things which are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. Now the things which are deduced from others by reasoning are conclusions, and the things which are desired for the sake of other things are means. Reason therefore is concerned with conclusions and freedom with means. Just as reason and the intellect arent really distinguished, but only according to their various functions, so the will and free will are one power, which nevertheless performs diverse functions. Finally its said the order of the end being preserved. Just as it belongs to the power of reason that it draw conclusions while preserving the order of the principles and conversely, to proceed to a conclusion while overlooking the order of the principles implies a defect of intellect and a fault against logic so it belongs to the perfection of freedom that it be able to choose various things while preserving the order of the end; but that it should choose something by departing from that order argues a defect of freedom and a fault against ethics.

how freedom is originatively from reason, formally from the will:

there are 3 opinions on this thesis. Henry of Ghent holds that the adequate principle of freedom is to be placed in the will alone; the judgement of reason; however, is prerequisite not as a principle but as a condition or cause without which freedom wouldnt exist. Scotus basically holds to the same here.

Durandus holds that freedom is prior in the intellect than in the will, not only radically, but also formally and properly.

St. Thomas, the thomists, st. bonaventure and the scholastics hold that freedom is originatively and causally in the intellect, but formally in the will alone.

refutation of the first opinion: freedom is indifference in desiring, that is the cause of freedom which produces indifference. But the intellect causes that indifference. Therefore it also causes freedom.

Proof of the minor: that causes indifference in desiring by virtue of which the will desires the object indifferently. but that by virtue of which the will desires indifferently is the indifference of the intellect: for the will desires the object either indifferently or necessarily, according as the judgement of reason proposes it. Therefore reason causes indifference in desiring.

Confirmation: freedom consists in choice. But choice originates and is caused by deliberation. Therefore freedom is originatively and causally from the faculty of deliberation, which is reason. Against durandus its proved that freedom is formally in the will. Every form or property is formally and principally in that thing by reason of which and in relation to which other things are said to be and are such as they are. Hence because other things are called true in relation to the intellect truth is formally and principally ascribed to the intellect. Now other things are constituted free in relation to the will, for the acts of the other powers, and the powers themselves are judged to enjoy freedom insofar as they participate somewhat in the freedom of the will and are commanded by the will. Ergo freedom must be placed principally and formally in the will.

Confirmation 2: freedom is properly judged to belong to that to which merit and sin are properly ascribed, and by reason of which we have dominion over our acts. But merit and sin, like the dominion over acts, are properly attributed to the will, not to the intellect; for sometimes an act of the intellect is to be regarded neither as meritorious nor as demeritorious, nor is it in our power. Ergo freedom is properly and formally in the faculty of the will.

distinction between freedom and will:

it was the opinion of some that freedom isnt a power, but a habit. But from the definition alone its shown that freedom can in no way be a habit, either natural or acquired. They held however that this habit isnt really distinct from the will but is the very faculty or ability of the will for eliciting free acts. This assertion is self contradictory. For since a habit is something intermediate between a power and an act, its contradictory for freedom to be a habit and yet not be distinguished from the power itself. Moreover, a habit, by its very force, disposes well or ill toward operation: whence no one uses a good habit badly, and no one uses a bad habit well. But free will stands indifferently toward choosing well or ill. Ergo it cant be a habit. Another opinion holds that free will is a power which arises from the soul through the mediation of the intellect and the will, distinct from both, as a kind of intermediate thing participating in something of each power: judgment from the intellect desire from the will. The common opinion maintains that the will and free will differ only by reason and according to their diverse functions. In the section regarding (proper definition of freedom) it was demonstrated how the second opinion is false and the third holds. Just as the intellect and reason stand on the intellective side, so the will and free will which is the elective power stands on the appetitive side. Now the intellect and reason are distinguished not really, but only according to their diverse functions. Therefore the same must be held of the will and free will. The major is explained. Just as to understand implies a simple reception of a thing, so to will implies a simple desire for an object; and just as to reason is to arrive from one things at knowledge of another, so to choose is to desire one thing for the sake of attaining another. Ergo to understand & to will, the intellect and the will correspond to each other; to reason & choose, reason & free will.

enemies of freedom:

heres all those that deny the spirituality of the soul i.e. materialists, sensists, or the human personality i.e. pantheists; but especially the fatalists, such as the manicheans, waldensians, albigensians and afterward the lutherans and calvinists. Fatalism was revived with new apparatus in the 17th century by bayle. This same error is now spreading under the school of thought of determinism, because as they say the will in its choices is necessarily ultimately determined. A 3fold determinism is distinguished: physical, psychological and metaphysical. Rome has always strenuously defended human freedom as dogma. Read Fr. marie-albert janvier’s “first conference on the struggles of religion on behalf of the dogma of freedom” on this.

proof of freedom from common sense:

Common sense is infallible regarding universal and constant judgements held among all peoples, especially if these principles run counter to the passions, since then no cause of error can be assigned. Now the existence of free will is a judgement of common sense which has always been constant among all peoples, and which is opposed to the passions. Ergo a judgement must be admitted as true and infallible

1. among all peoples its believed that man is subject to laws and precepts and is inclined by counsels and exhortations. But if freedom is removed then laws and counsels are rendered useless and impossible; for counsels or laws arent given to agents that act by nature.

2. among all people there has existed some sanction of human acts rewards and praises for certain acts, censures and punishments for others. But if man lacks freedom he is undeservedly rewarded and unjustly punished. Nor can it be said that he is rewarded or punished as an example, for an example ought not to be made unjustly nor is it valid where necessity holds sway.

3. among all people theres been some notion of morality; whence ethics, or moral philosophy, has always been counted among the parts of philosophy. But morality, freedom being removed, cant even be conceived: for a human act is an act proceeding from freedom. Likewise, duty, without freedom, would be a fiction: he who ought, can; he who is bound to fulfill something, is able to fulfill it. This proclaimed by all people who clearly distinguish moral law meant for free beings, from physical law, or law that is inescapable. Read fr. janvier’s 2nd conference on this.

there cant be a cause of error here for such a judgement runs counter to the passions. For once freedom is called into doubt, the reins are loosened for concupiscence and vice, and true moral sanction becomes impossible; but once freedom and the imputability of actions are admitted, theres already a firm bond for restraining the passions. If you want to read the argument at length then check out farges’ fondements de la morale, fr. janvier’s la liberte

proof of freedom from conscience:

our conscience reports some of our actions as free, others as necessary. Now no reason can be assigned for this distinction unless freedom exists. Ergo it exists. For conscience is a witness to what we intimately experience. But if no action is free, why do we experience some as free, others as necessary? Indeed so great is the force of this testimony that from it arise marvelous and heroic choices. For its from the consciousness of freedom that heroes and great souled men raise themselves to brave deeds, and yet their hope isnt disappointed. But if the consciousness of freedom were a mere illusion, it couldnt so universally produce marvelous effects, and those who trust in it would at times be deceived. Ergo the argument from consciousness is a strong argument for freedom.

1. conscious testifies only to what we now feel or do, not to what we shall do, it concerns the present not the future. Therefore through conscience we cant know if in the future we shall choose one thing over another, or if we possess the power of free will. Conscience then can testify to acts but not power or faculties.

reply to 1: conscience testifies that present or past acts are free. Now from the nature of a fully conscious act, the nature of the power is safely inferred: if all acts in the preset and the past are free not once, but constantly and most frequently it must be concluded that there is in us some faculty of acting freely, not once, but again and constantly. Hence the testimony of conscience is the unshaken foundation of the argument by which the power of free will is invincibly proved.

2. we are indeed conscious of choosing one thing over another, but perhaps some hidden cause lies concealed which necessarily determines us to take one thing rather than another. Whence there is in us rather an unconsciousness of necessity than a consciousness of freedom.

reply: we dont only have an unconsciousness of necessity, but a positive consciousness by which we quite clearly distinguish free actions from necessary and chance ones. We act not by hesitating or doubting, but with a full persuasion of freedom, nor does this persuasion deceive us. Indeed, those who seem to doubt freedom affirm it in practice. The possibility of this hidden cause which would necessarily determine us to choose one things over another requires to be proved in some way. Experience doesnt detect or even suspect such cause, reason however shows that its repugnant, from the very nature of man, that there should be some intrinsic cause that necessarily moves and determines us. We arent only unconscious of that necessitating cause, but we know scientifically that such as cause cant exist.

proof of freedom from nature of rational substance:

The will arises from the essence of the soul through the mediation of the intellect and since its a blind power following apprehension, the will desires things in the manner in which theyre proposed by the intellect as desirable. Now the intellect apprehends and proposes beatitude in general, and the means necessarily connected with it, as necessarily to be desired; particular goods, however, since they dont have a necessary connection with the end, the intellect apprehends and proposes as indifferently to be desired. Therefore the will which is necessitated with respect to beatitude in general remains indifferent with respect to particular goods. Now that indifference is freedom. Ergo rational substance enjoys freedom.

Explaining the minor: in all particular goods, the intellect apprehends both a reason of some good and a lack of some good; for example in chastity there is a reason of good (the beauty) and merit of the virtue but theres also a reason of some defect (the difficulty) the constant struggle against the movements of concupiscence. Now a defect has the character of an evil. Because then the object in itself takes on the character of a good, it is choosable; and because it also takes on the character of some evil, its avoidable. The intellect ergo cant propose it as necessarily to be chosen or necessarily to be avoided, but presents it indifferently as choosable or avoidable. Now on the other hand beatitude in general since its a perfect good lacking no perfection cant be apprehended under the aspect of evil or defect and hence is proposed as necessarily to be desired. In another way a mobile being isnt moved necessarily except by a mover which surpasses the power of the mobile. but no particular good surpasses or equals the power of the will. Ergo no particular good necessarily moves the will

reason for the minor: the power of the will is concerned with the infinite. For the will follows the intellect which apprehends the infinite. Whence just as the object of the intellect is the universal truth, so the object of the will is the universal good. But any particular good is finite and limited. Ergo it cant equal the power of the will. Therefore freedom flows from the intrinsic nature of the intellect and the will. Now if the intrinsic nature of the will causes freedom its contradictory that there should be some hidden intrinsic cause, as the determinists contend, which would necessarily impel us to do one particular thing. The existence of freedom is proved not only by a posteriori from the consent of the human race and from experience but invincibly a priori, by apodictic demonstration. Recent authors deny that the force of this argument is demonstrative because there are certain particular goods which nevertheless dont leave indifference in the will, but immediately generate in it complacency, affection, delight as is clear in the movements called “first-first” (i.e. pre deliberate, spontaneous movements). But the argument of St. Thomas concerns particular goods not taken in just any way but as proposed by the intellect through an indifferent judgement; whereas the first-first movements precede/escape an indifferent judgement. Moreover when we say that the will remains indifferent regarding finite goods, we dont mean that its wholly without complacency toward them, but only that it can ultimately abstain from accepting them. The intellect necessarily sees the object, even a finite one, as having the character of some good, and couldnt except by erring, propose it as simply to be avoided. Thus the will can necessarily experience some complacency in that object just as someone looking at a beautiful painting necessarily rejoices; but that complacency isnt so great that the object is chosen as a necessary means. For the intellect although it necessarily apprehends the thing as some good, nevertheless elicits an indifferent judgement because on the other side the object also hags the character of an evil and something to be avoided. Similarly the will although it necessarily takes some complacency in a finite good nevertheless remains indifferent as to finally choosing it. The proof then stands just as the psychological principle stands: an indifferent will follows an indifferent judgement

assigning the roots of freedom:

Theres a 2fold root of freedom: one being intrinsic and the other extrinsic. The extrinsic root is God for God is the cause of the whole of being and of all its differences. Now necessity, contingency, and freedom are modes of being. Ergo God is the cause of contingency and of freedom; and, since His will is most efficacious, He brings it about that our acts, which He wills to be free, are truly free. The immediate intrinsic root of freedom is the breadth and universality of the will, and its eminence above all the particular goods; the mediate root is the breadth and universality of the intellect in knowing and judging; the remote root is the universality and breadth of rational nature itself in its being.First, indeed, rational nature has a certain universality in being, insofar as, through apprehended forms, or intelligible species, it can in a certain manner become all things and receive the natures of all things — not indeed in real being, but in representative and intelligible being. From this first universality arises the universality of the intellect in judging. For from the fact that rational nature has eminence above matter, which is the principle determining to one thing, it follows that the judgment of the intellect is not restricted to one thing, but can attain the object under all its aspects, turn it every way, and consider in it what is worthy of love or hatred, what is useful or harmful, etc. From this consideration arises the indifference of judgment. From this breadth and universality of the intellect in judging is born the universality of the will in desiring. For the will follows the intellect, and an indifferent appetite follows an indifferent judgment. From the fact, then, that the intellect retains universality with respect to every truth, it follows that universality with respect to every good must likewise be ascribed to the will. But if the will is concerned with the universal good, its capacity cannot be filled and satisfied by particular goods, but has eminence and independence above all of them. From this eminence arises the indifference of the appetite, which properly constitutes freedom. Whence the universality, or spirituality, of rational nature in being causes universality and indifference in judging; universality in judging immediately causes universality and indifference of the will in desiring, in which freedom is formally placed.The fundamental and first root of freedom, then, is the spirituality of rational nature. This again becomes clear from a comparison with things lacking reason. A proportionate inclination follows every form. A form totally immersed in matter is followed by a single inclination determined to one thing; wherefore in such things no kind of freedom is manifested. But forms which emerge somewhat from matter, as in brute animals, claim for themselves some breadth; for they receive the forms of other things with a certain independence from matter — now one form, now another, now the form of the pleasurable, now the form of the sad. Whence brute animals do not have an invariably determined appetite, but are now glad, now sad; and hence some imitation and likeness of freedom is detected in them. But because the forms received in them are not entirely and simply immaterial, but subject to the conditions of matter, since they depend on a bodily organ, they retain a principle determining to one thing. Whence it comes about that their inclination is not properly indifferent and free. But intellectual forms, since they receive the forms of things without any condition of matter, lack any principle determining to one thing, and therefore possess full indifference and freedom.

answer to the argument from conservation of energy:

Objection: The world is a system of forces subject only to its own mutual interactions, in which the sum of energies, both potential and actual, is always constant and the same. But if free will exists, there will be changes and variations in this system of forces, and the sum of forces will no longer remain the same. Therefore free will is impossible.First Reply: The aforementioned difficulty concerns only commanded acts, which are exercised through the body and which are called extrinsically free, but not intrinsically free acts — that is, elicited acts of the will, which are entirely immaterial, and in which no bodily energy intervenes or can intervene. For the determination of freedom is an act of a faculty entirely spiritual, incorporeal, suprasensible, existing outside the cosmic order; consequently, such an operation is not the production of any material and mechanical energy. Now, if the will’s operation and intervention is not the production of new energy, the will can act without the sum of actual and potential energies being varied in any way. Therefore the intervention of freedom, taken under this aspect, leaves the law of conservation of energy entirely intact.Second Reply: Deny the supposition. Determinists suppose that material forces are subject only to their own mutual interactions, and that there can be no higher cause capable of governing these forces. Surely vital forces, sensitive or intellectual powers, are superior to material energies; why then could they not have an influence upon them? Physical facts by no means show this repugnance; philosophy, on the contrary, demonstrates that it is possible indeed necessary that an intellectual cause should act upon material forces, both a created intellectual cause and, especially, the infinite intellectual cause, which, just as it freely instituted material forces and energies, can also freely modify them. There exists, then, a spiritual principle directing energies and superior to them. Indeed, even in the material order there is some directing principle. Its shown in the Philosophy of Nature that it is repugnant that everything be reduced to purely mechanical motion; but that there exists in bodies a 2fold element: one material, which is the root of quantity, extension, divisibility, etc.; the other formal, specifying, which is the cause of unity and activity. Now the formal principle governs and dominates matter: which is proved both from the direction of mechanical motion for, the same sum of energy remaining, motion is directed in this sense rather than that and from the formation of crystals; and from the unity of a being; and from the internal tendency which is especially detected in living things.

The form is the directing and specifying principle; matter however is the quantitative and invariable principle. Admitting the scholastic system concerning form & matter, the law of conservation of energies isnt hard to understand. The quantity of energies isnt varied, because matter (the root of quantity) is a permanent and invariable principle; but the human soul can direct energy, because generally every form, even in an organic being, can direct and dominate matter and quantity, notwithstanding the invariability of matter and quantity. Therefore physical determinism is best refuted by the 2fold scholastic principle: form and matter. Hence the law of conservation of energies far from being an obstacle to freedom, would rather confirm the existence of prime matter. In form I deny the sum of energies always being the same as to quality; as to quantity i subdistinguish: the same materially is granted; but formally is denied.

Contradistinction of the minor: if freedom intervenes the sum of energies wont be the same as to quality (granted); as to quantity its subdistinguished since it wont be the same materially (granted); it will not be the same materially (denied) and the consequence is also to be denied. The one thing that science is able to establish is the material identity in the sum of energies; concerning the identities of qualities or even the formal identity of quantity, its silent and will always remain as such since these are the object of philosophy. To satisfy the object its sufficient to show that the intervention of freedom doesnt affect the material identity found in the sum of energies. A common question here is “what does the intervention of freedom effect?” It changes quality, by directing forces, and by affecting quality it also somewhat modifies quantity, which is the subject of quality. But this is also a formal change, which leaves quantity materially the same; just as generally in any change of forms the matter and the same quantity which arises from matter as its root always remains. Science establishes material identity (was said earlier) and this freedom leaves intact, for quantity remains the same under diverse changes; but freedom does change quality, or even the formal identity of quantity; but science doesnt concern itself with these changes whilst philosophy on the other shows that such changes can occur, do occur, the form directing matter and energies, notwithstanding the material invariability of energies. So the question can be concluded in a word: quality, with which scientists arent concerned is varied whilst quantity, which science establishes, remains. Quantity is also varied formally a variation with which science isnt concerned but quantity remains materially the same, and its only this identity that physicists are concerned with. If you want to understand better how quality is modified by the soul without quantity being varied you need to remember the distinction between transient and immanent action. In transient action which involves a certain collision and mechanical motion, theres a loss of force, and new energy is required to produce this mechanical change. In immanent action however no collision intervenes and the soul acts as an unmoved mover, which isnt moved in the same genus of motion. It can therefore move (reduce from potency to act) not through motion of the same genus but only through qualitative operation, without mechanical and quantitative motion; and thus it can act upon quantity, not through the mediation of another quantity, but only through qualitative action as if God or an angel were acting within something not by moving it locally and mechanically but through immanent operation. The soul ergo can modify the qualities of forces, their quantity remaining unvaried. These replies should all be sufficient to solve the objections.

Physics in view of the law of conservation of energy cant foresee the intervention of the will any more than that of an angel or God; so it practically ignores such interventions because theyre outside its scope; but in no way does it testify that the action of a higher cause, which might change the cosmic order and modify either the quality or quantity of energies is impossible. That law then concerns what occurs within the cosmic order: so its certain that the phenomena which physics knows and foresees introduces no variation in the sum of energies but concerning the other phenomena, which science doesnt foresee but which presuppose a higher and free cause, the law isnt concerned with.

Albert Farges in his fondements de la morale: “The law, therefore doesnt affect human freedom any more than divine freedom; its an objection neither against the one nor against the other”

Fr. Duhem notes in his physique de croyant: “for us the principle of the conservation of energy is in no way a certain and general affirmation concerning really existing objects. Its a mathematical formula, established by a free decree of our understanding, so that this formula, combined with other formulas postulated in an analogous manner, may allow us to deduce a series of consequences, and that these consequences may provide us with a sufficient representation of the laws observed in our laboratories.... It is already clear that this question — ‘Is the law of the conservation of energy compatible or not with free will?’ — can have no meaning for us.... We were certain in advance that in the classification we were constructing, no place was reserved for free acts. If, then, we find, after this, that a free act cannot be included in our classification, we would be quite naïve to be astonished at it, and quite foolish to conclude from it that free will is impossible”

against psychological determinism:

Psychological determinism draws its arguments out from the faculties of the soul itself.

1. in order for a choice to be reasonable there needs to be a determining motive for choosing one thing over another: if one motive doesnt determine another will since an infinite regress isnt possible. Now if a determining motive impels the will, the will isnt free. Ergo the very nature of choice makes freedom impossible

resp to 1: distinguish the major: for a choice to be reasonable there needs to be a determining motive meaning a sufficient reason for willing one thing over another (granted); a necessitating reason for choosing one over another (denied). Contradistinguish the minor and deny the consequence. A choice would be unreasonable if it were made without a suitable reason: where it must be admitted that in every choice a sufficient motive concurs; but the thomists deny that a necessitating motive is present. The ultimate end is a necessitating motive but concerning the end there isnt a choice; now various particular goods can have a sufficient reason for being chosen, insofar as in them is considered the reason of a means to the end; from where if the will takes one thing over another it doesnt proceed blindly. But none of them has a necessary reason for being accepted over another because as was said many times by various thomists, no particular good is necessarily connected with the end. Then if one thing is chosen the others being rejected this comes from full independence of the will

2. the will necessarily follows from the last practical judgement so its not free

resp to 2: it necessarily follows with hypothetical necessity (granted), absolute necessity (denied). By the very fact that the will applies the intellect to elicit a practical judgement it implicitly wills to follow that judgement nor can it without contradiction disent while this judgement stands. This however is a hypothetical necessity which presupps freedom. For the will could have applied the intellect to another judgment indeed it can even now turn the intellect to opposite judgment.

3. other objections seem to rest on experience. Physiological conditions, passions, moral inclinations impose necessity; whence we see men infallibly impelled and determined to certain actions

resp to 3: these influences at times can disturb reason; in which case freedom is manifestly absent. But commonly they dont remove the judgement of reason; and therefore free will persists, although inclined and weakened. Impediments sometimes arise from a sensibility that is altered and no longer follows the impulse of the will. This doesnt prove that freedom is lacking in man instead that the concurrence of the sensitive or motive power is insufficient. The physiological conditions of freedom is whats failing then not the very power of freedom, just as intellection is sometimes disturbed, not by a defect of the intellective power but bya defect of the extrinsic conditions prerequisite for intellection. These cases concern certain illnesses; and they dont prove anything with respect to those who are healthy and in possession of all their faculties.

against metaphysical determinism:

3 foundations:

1. the order of the universe is necessary. (read hugon’s cosmology for the refutation)

2. if free will exists, moral evil can exist. But God cant permit evil ergo free will doesnt exist

resp: God can draw a greater good out of evil. Moreover evil will finally be punished and reduced to the order of divine justice

3. Divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will. Either, then, divine foreknowledge must be rejected, or free will must be denied.

resp: these 2 are fundamental dogmas that all must hold. Divine providence foreknows all things and than man enjoys freedom of will although their reconciliation isnt easily grasped but this objection is responded in banez’ treatise against the molinists.bossuet treatise on free will: “If we had to destroy either freedom by Providence, or Providence by freedom, we would not know where to begin; so necessary are these two things, and so evident and indubitable are the ideas we have of them.”“The will follows, and does not precede, the intellect, by which it necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good fulfilling the appetite in every respect, but among several goods, which are proposed as desirable by a changeable judgment, it freely chooses. Choice, accordingly, follows the last practical judgment; but that this judgment is the last, the will itself brings about.”