On distinctions
General intro.
This is a short paper by Havoc regarding the various distinctions in the various scholastic schools and which the Thomists hold, what they dont and why. This paper will cover the definitions, classifications, and systematic applications of these distinctions, as well as the metaphysical foundations for refuting the non-thomist errors.
Notion + metaphysical foundations for distinctions
Distinction is fundamentally defined as plurality or multitude. In technical metaphysical terms, it signifies the remotion or lack of unity of identity. Things are said to be distinct when they arent the same. The principle follows the order and nature of being: as being is diverse and multiple in the world, the intellect must recognize the lack of identity between entities or aspects of entities. To ensure precision the thomist metaphysicians differentiate between 4 related concepts
Distinction: the lack of identity between things; plurality
Division: the act or state of separation
Diversity: total distinction where things have nothing in common (v.g. Man and color)
Difference: partial distinction where things share something in common but are distinguished by specific notes (v.g. Intellectual vs moral virtue)
Formal oppositions for each of the 4 concepts:
Distinction is formally opposed to identity
Division is formally opposed to union and continuity
Diversity is formally opposed to commonality
Difference is formally opposed to absolute identity within a genus
Classification of distinctions
Distinctions are divided into 2 primary genera based on their relation to reality and the intellect
Real distinction (distinctio realis): a real distinction is the remotion of identity that obtains in reality, independent of any operation of the intellect.
Major (absolute) real distinction: a distinction between 2 or more separate things (v.g. The distinction between peter and a house, or between quantity and quality)
Minor (modal/formal) real distinction: This distinction is split into 2 1. Between the thing and its mode, 2. Between two modes of the same thing.(1). The distinction between an object and its specific state (v.g. The nose and its curve)(2). The distinction between 2 different states of 1 entity (v.g. The curve and straightness of a body)
Distinction of reason (distinctio rationis): a distinction of reason is a lack of identity made by the intellect which doesnt exist in reality.
1. Distinction of reasoning reason:
Foundation: created solely by the mind without a specific foundation in the object
Nature: it preserves both material and formal identity. It consists in the diverse mode of signifying the same object (v.g. “Peter is peter”, where peter is conceived first as the subject and then as predicate)
2. Distinction of reason reasoned / virtual distinction:
Foundation: formed by the intellect with a foundation in reality
Nature: it destroys formal identity (the definitions differ) while preserving material identity (the entity is one)
Virtual distinction defined: the eminent perfection of a thing which, in its one simple entity, contains multiple aspects, each of which has its own definition.
Refutations of the non thomistic distinctions
The thomists maintain that any distinction must either be real or of reason. Middle distinctions or error regarding the nature of “being of reason” lead to metaphysical contradictions.
Against the middle distinction
the middle distinction has some scotist influence, the thomists say that there are only 2 genera of being: 1. Real being and 2. Being of reason. Consequently there are only 2 genera of distinction: real and reason. A formal actual distinction thats neither real nor a product of the mind is going to be metaphysically impossible for 2 reasons:
Identity logic: things are either identical in reality or they arent. If they arent identical in reality, the distinction is real. If theyre identical in reality but separated by the mind, the distinction is of Reason.
Foundation: a distinction with a foundation in reality (virtual distinction) sufficiently accounts for different “formalities” without requiring them to be “actual” before the mind’s operation.
Against nominalism and conceptualism
It’s common knowledge that the nominalists deny that universal concepts (second intention) have a foundation in the essence of things. The moderate realists (thomists) refute this by establishing 2 things:
Foundation of the virtual distinction: perfection in a simple entity (like God or the human soul) can contain multiple aspects that arent merely names but are grounded in the “eminent perfection” of the object
Real accidents: distinctions between a substance and its accidents (v.g. Man and his knowledge) are real, not merely conceptual, because accidents have a different mode of existence (existence in) than substance (existence per se)
Against modern rationalism (a.k.a cartesianism)
The modal real distinction refutes the idea of reducing substance to a singular attribute (v.g. extension). The intellect distinguishes between the substance (the thing) and its mode (the state of the thing). A mode cant be the same as the substance because the substance can persist whilst the mode changes (v.g. A body remaining the same whilst its shape/curvature changes)
Refutation of Scotus
The thomist school rejects the distinctio formalis a parte rei. Probo minorem: a distinction is either a negation of identity in reality (real) or isnt (logical). To propose a “Formal” distinction thats independent of the mind yet doesnt constitute a real distinction of things is a violation of the principle of contradiction. A thing either is or isnt another thing in reality (p -p); there isnt a middle ground in the ontological order. Scotus’ formalities must either be res or modus, or they collapse into a distinction of reason.
Refutation of Suarez
The main issue the thomists have against suarists is the distinction between essence and existence in creatures. Suarez posits a distinction of reason (ratiocinatae) but the thomists maintain a real distinction.
Arg. from pure act: if essentia and esse were identical in a creature, the creature would exist by its very nature. It would be actus purus (pure act) which is the exclusive definition of God. To deny this real distinction is to destroy the infinite difference between God and Creature.
Regarding the application in metaphysics
Theology: the simplicity of God
In the metaphysics of the infinite being, God is defined as absolutely simple. There isnt any real distinction between His essence and His attributes (i.e. mercy, justice, etc)
Application: the distinction between the divine attributes is a virtual distinction (reason reasoned). God’s one simple entity contains these perfections eminently. They are formally distinct (mercy isnt justice) but materially identical (both are the one God).
General metaphysics: Essence and existence
Finite being: in creatures there’s a real distinction between essence and existence. Essence is what the thing is; existence is the act by which it is. In infinite beings, these arent identical.
Transcendental properties: the properties of being (unity, truth, goodness) are distinguished from being by a virtual minor distinction. They only add a relation of reason or a negation to the concept of being.
Special metaphysics and psychology
Substance and accidents: there’s a real distinction between a substance and its accidental perfections (v.g. A man and his tan)
Soul and powers: theres a real distinction between the soul (first principle of life) and its operational powers (intellect, will). The soul is the substantial form, but its powers are accidents through which it acts.
Supposit and nature: the supposit (person) is distinguished from the individual nature. While they are materially the same, the supposit adds the “mode of subsistence” creating a modal real distinction
Scholastic maxims
Distinctio sequitur ens: distinction follows being (where theres plurality of being, theres distinction)
Identitas materialis, distinctio formalis: material identity (one thing) with formal distinction (different definitions), characterizing the virtual distinction
Dictum de omni / dictum de nullo: principles governing how a predicate is affirmed or denied of a universal subject and its distinct inferiors
Heres my paper in pdf format:

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