Banez on if there is freedom in God

The conclusion is affirmative, and is clear from article 3. The reason is: since God wills things other than himself, and not by necessity, therefore with respect to those things he has free will.

The principal doubt in this article regarding the conclusion is whether, according to natural reason, it must necessarily be affirmed that free will properly and without metaphor exists in God — so that God himself is master of his own actions, and can not have the action he has, and can have the action he does not have.

First argument on the negative side. In God there is properly speaking no counsel — therefore neither is there free will. The consequence is clear, because deliberation, by which one deliberates to determine some means to an end, proceeds from a comparison of the means that can be chosen toward an end. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, I–II, q. 14, art. 2, and from St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 5, chapter 5, who assert that counsel presupposes an inquiry into means and ignorance of the certain means for attaining the end; and St. Thomas says that inquiry of reason in doubtful and uncertain matters is called counsel. But such imperfection cannot exist in God — therefore neither can counsel.

Second argument. Everyone who has free will is by nature indifferent to deliberating or not deliberating about something, to performing some act or not performing it. But this indifference is repugnant to God, to whom it is proper always to be in the same state and unable to be otherwise than he is — therefore free will is repugnant to God.But if someone responds that the indifference of free will in God is not with respect to any divine act but extrinsically through relation to the being or non-being of a creature — a counter-reply is made. If there were indifference in God in this way, according to his relation to creatures, it would be either with respect to those creatures that are not and were not and will not be, or with respect to those that coexist with eternity in some difference of their time. But neither of these can be — therefore that indifference is not possible. I prove the minor. For with respect to creatures that coexist with eternity, the divine will is not indifferent, but willed determinately that they should exist. Similarly, with respect to those that do not coexist with eternity, there is no indifference. For from eternity God willed those things not to exist — therefore there is no relation of the divine will that is indifferent with respect to creatures, and thus free will is repugnant to God.

Third argument. If free will exists in God, it follows that God is not altogether immutable, but can be otherwise than he now is in himself — and the consequent is against James 1: "With whom there is no variation or shadow of turning." To appreciate the force of this argument, note that man and angel are said in their own way to be immutable, or not to change, with respect to free will. A man is not said to be blameably changeable when he changes his plan owing to new circumstances arising — but in fact the will of a man can change and does change when, after having willed something to happen, without any entirely new circumstance arising, he now wills it not to happen, whether that change is blameworthy or praiseworthy. An angel, however, is not mutable in that way owing to the perfection of his nature; rather, once he has chosen something he cannot choose the opposite. Yet in the angel a mutability in free will is considered insofar as the choice he has, he could have not had — and consequently could be otherwise in himself than he now is. But in God (says James) there is no variation or shadow of turning, because the divine will cannot have not had from eternity every action that it has in itself — but just as it now is in itself, so it is necessarily so by necessity of nature. Now the inference is proved. For if there is free will in God, so that he can make things otherwise than he does, it is necessary that in the divine will, which is the cause of things, some difference be possible, and that it could have been otherwise in itself than it now is. The inference is proved because by natural reason it seems manifest that a total cause remaining in entirely the same and invariable state, and incapable of being impeded or modified by anything external, must necessarily always produce the same effect — and what is not produced cannot be produced. Therefore it does not seem intelligible that, with no change made in the divine will, the world comes into being from nothing, and from the same will in the same state the world does not come into being. Therefore this diversity of effects — namely, that the world comes from nothing and that the world does not come from nothing — must necessarily be referred to some possible variety in the cause, which is the divine will; and consequently the divine will would be otherwise if it had not created than it now is in willing to create.

Fourth argument. In demons there is no freedom in the act of will with respect to the object of pride, because angels immutably adhere to the object they once willed — and this because of the perfection of the angelic nature. Therefore neither in God is there freedom with respect to the things he willed from eternity. The consequence is clear, because God is much more immutable than an angel. The antecedent is proved because if the angel were now to act freely, his guilt would always increase — and consequently the punishment due would increase in eternity without any limit.

Fifth and final argument. Aristotle — who is called a prodigy of nature — denied that the first cause operates freely, and asserted that it moves by necessity of nature, just as it moves all things. Therefore, according to natural reason, it is repugnant to, or at least cannot be gathered that, free will is in God. The antecedent is clear from Physics book 8, texts 7 and 8, where he says that if the first mover did not move previously, it was necessary, in order for it to move afterward, that an impediment be removed by which it was hindered. Here he seems to presuppose that God acts by necessity of nature — otherwise his argument would be frivolous. For one could have responded that the first mover is free and therefore could have not moved, not because of an impediment but because it did not will to move. And in the same place, text 15, he says it is absurd for God not to have acted from eternity and then to have acted. Furthermore, in book I of On the Heavens, chapters 10 and following, he says the heavens are ungenerable and incorruptible. But if Aristotle had understood God to be a free efficient cause with respect to the heavens, he would have asserted that the heavens could be corrupted and the world destroyed — therefore, etc. And this is confirmed all the more because Aristotle was ignorant of production from nothing — therefore according to his teaching it was necessary that something besides God be eternal, namely prime matter from which corruptible species would be made, and the intelligences themselves, which are not made from matter. And finally in Metaphysics book 9, text 17, and book 12, text 30, he says that the heavens cannot not be moved, and that God and the intelligences do not have the power not to move, but are always actually moving.

For the decision of this difficulty, we must presuppose from the teaching of St. Thomas, I, q. 14, art. 1, ad 2, that what is said of God is to be accepted without any defect that is found in us. This is to be understood not only of those things said eminently of God, but also of those said formally — for example, knowledge in us is of conclusions through reasoning from causes to effects, but knowledge said of God signifies certainty about all effects in the first cause without any reasoning. There is also the example in angels, in whom knowledge is a quality superadded to the angelic intellect, while in God it is his substance. Note secondly with Cajetan, in that place, that counsel in us signifies complete inquiry — that is, up to and including judgment — since inquiry without judgment is not counsel except in a preliminary sense. Therefore in counsel, as its specific proper nature, what is to be considered is the very terminus of the inquiry. However, the inquiry itself and the practical reasoning require our own proper imperfection. With these presuppositions laid down, the First Conclusion is: counsel formally and properly and without metaphor exists in God. First proof: since knowledge is properly and formally placed in God without metaphor, so too prudence is placed in God properly and formally — therefore so too is counsel. The antecedent is admitted by all metaphysicians and theologians. The consequence is proved because, just as knowledge, although defined by us as a habit acquired through demonstration, is nonetheless understood by us according to its proper and specific nature — insofar as knowledge as knowledge is a certain power of knowing effects in their cause — so too counsel, although in us it presupposes inquiry, is according to its proper nature a practical judgment about some means that in itself does not have necessary connection with an end. And such a judgment is no more repugnant to God than a judgment of knowledge, which is properly and formally found in God — since its specific nature does not necessarily require reasoning, or the nature of a habit, or of a quality that is an accident of a substance. Second proof: according to the widespread teaching of St. Augustine, those things which are said in Scripture and which can be understood without metaphor, ought to be understood according to the propriety of speech. But counsel is frequently found in Scripture said of God — for example, Ephesians 1: "Who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Therefore, just as will is placed in God properly and formally, so too counsel is properly to be affirmed as existing in God, with all imperfections removed that belong to counsel as it exists in rational creatures.Second Conclusion. Free will truly and properly and formally exists in God, just as do wisdom and knowledge. This conclusion is certain both from Sacred Scripture and from natural reason. First proof from the preceding conclusion: since counsel exists properly in God, so too does free will. The consequence is proved because counsel concerns a means that in itself has no necessary connection with the end, and yet is judged to be orderable and to be ordered toward the end. But free will is nothing other than, as theologians define it, the faculty of reason and will toward either option. Therefore, with respect to the means about which there is counsel, there is freedom of will to choose it or not. For if the means were necessarily willed, there would not be counsel about it either. Second proof from the argument of St. Thomas in this article: God wills things other than himself, and not by necessity of his nature — therefore with respect to those things he has free will. The major is manifest, because since God is the ultimate end and naturally wills the ultimate end, it necessarily follows that whatever else exists in the nature of things besides God, that it exists for the sake of the ultimate end. The minor is proved because the goodness of God, which is the ultimate end, is by itself alone most perfect, since it is existence itself by essence — therefore the divine will wills no other good by necessity of its nature. The consequence is clear, because the necessity of the will with respect to means arises from nowhere else than from the fact that the attainment of the end depends in some genus of cause on those means. Therefore, since the attainment of that divine end in no way depends on any means, it follows manifestly that the divine will does not by necessity will anything other than itself.Third proof: in us there is free will, as is to be held by faith, as natural reason dictates, and as experience testifies — therefore free will also exists in God. This consequence is proved because when a man is freely moved by his own action, he is moved either by himself as his first mover, or by God. If by himself, then there is some motion in the creature that is not reduced to God as to the first mover and moving cause upon whose motion the creature acting and moving itself depends — and thus God would not be master of the free will of man, which would be blasphemous. But if you say that man is moved by God as the first mover, yet not as one who moves freely but as one who moves by necessity of nature — against this it follows that man is not moved freely. The inference is proved. For this inference is valid: "God moves my will — therefore my will is moved by God." Furthermore: if the antecedent is necessary by necessity of nature, my will is not moved freely — since it is impossible that God should move me and that my will should not be moved. Where then will the freedom of the action be? For the consequence is necessary from the nature of the thing, and the antecedent is also conceded to be absolutely necessary — therefore my freedom is entirely destroyed. But perhaps some superficial thinker will respond that an equally strong argument can be made even if God is a free mover through his free will. For the argument would proceed: "God by his will, though free, yet efficaciously moves me — therefore I am moved." The consequence is indeed necessary, and the antecedent is necessary by supposition — therefore, given the truth of the antecedent, my will cannot not be moved — therefore it is not moved freely, since God moves the will no less efficaciously by his free will than if he were to move it by necessity of nature. To this objection the final consequence must be denied. The reason is: although that antecedent "God moves my will" has the necessity of supposition in the composite sense — that is, on the supposition that he freely wills to move, it is necessarily simultaneously verified that he moves — nonetheless he moves freely, because he can simply not move, since he can will not to move. Yet from this my freedom is not destroyed, but rather perfected. For from the divine free act that efficaciously and gently moves, my will itself participates in freedom and is freely moved. But on these matters enough was said in article 8. Fourth proof of the conclusion: what is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency must, as often as it is in act, be moved by another. But if God were to operate by necessity of nature, our will could not sometimes be in act and sometimes in potency — therefore God operates by free will. The minor is proved because our free will can be efficaciously moved by no other than God; but if God moves by necessity of nature, no reason can be assigned why the will now passes into act and now remains in potency.The theological proof from St. Paul: But now at last the conclusion is proved by a theological and necessary argument. And I lay down this excellent foundation from the testimony of the Apostle in Romans 1: "His invisible things," he says, "from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." In this testimony two things are to be weighed by us, from which we shall construct a twofold argument. The first is how the Apostle testifies that from the perfections of creatures the divine perfections can be investigated and demonstrated. The argument therefore is: we ourselves experience free will, which is a supreme perfection — therefore free will is in God. Nor does it avail to respond that free will is not a simple perfection. For as we have already shown, the faculty and power of acting freely includes no formal imperfection according to its proper nature — any more than knowledge or wisdom. But this is further confirmed: for man through the faculty of free will has the power to master other things and to order them as pleases him toward an end intended by himself. Since therefore God is supremely master of those things that exist outside himself, and has disposed and ordered all things for himself as for the ultimate end, as is found in Proverbs 16, it is necessary that God be supremely free. And this is confirmed from what we read in Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." On this testimony all the doctors, especially the scholastics, say that man is made in the image of God chiefly in that, through free will, he acts freely, as if a judge and master of his own actions. Whence he can also govern the rest of things, referring them to himself and himself to God as to the prototype after whose likeness he was formed. For it must be considered that the divine essence itself is the most excellent prototype which all created things imitate according to their measure. For all things have being from the divine essence, which exists through itself; and those that live receive life from that life which is itself through itself. But no creature other than the rational and intellectual one is said to be made in the image and likeness of God — because the best that is honorably understood in God is intellect, will, and the providence and judgment of all things, which is signified to us by the very name of God, which among the Greeks is derived from "providence." But this is much more intimated in the cited passage from Genesis, where in the Hebrew language in which the text was originally written, it says: "And Elohim created" — that is, judge or judges — "Adam in his image. In the image of Elohim he created him." As if to say, "in the image of a judge." For man was created to be as a certain judge, a kind of vicar of God on earth, so that concerning his own actions, according to the natural and divine law inscribed in him, he would dispose by his own judgment and refer himself together with all other things to the supreme judge. We have therefore that from the free will of man, free will in God is gathered — and that the free will of God flows into our will and confers freedom upon it, and efficaciously and gently moves it to free actions. Now the second thing we promised to weigh in the testimony of the Apostle presses more forcefully. For the Apostle says: "Because when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks." From these words it is gathered by necessary inference that the Apostle is speaking of the knowledge that men had of God from the power of natural light. For he says: "Because when they knew God" — that is, as the author and governor of the world — and he reproves them for sinning in that "they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks." But if God does not freely move and govern all things, and does not watch over and provide for human affairs, no thanks would be owed to him. For thanks are given to one who freely and gratuitously confers a benefit. We do not give thanks to the heavenly bodies, even though we receive great benefit from their influences. Nor again do we give thanks to God himself for what he does by necessity of nature — for example, we do not give thanks because he generates a Son equal to himself; but we do give thanks because he freely deigned to reveal to us that eternal generation, and sent his only begotten Son into the world, that everyone who believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. Thus we have concluded efficaciously from Sacred Scripture what can be known by natural reason — that free will is in God — since the Apostle testifies that natural reason dictates that God is to be glorified by us, and that immense thanks are to be given to him for the benefits received.

Banez’s replies to the remaining objections: But now I judge it will be of great benefit to theologians, in the course of my replies to the arguments I raised on the opposite side, to show where the proper nature of a free action consists.To the arguments of the opposing side: To the first: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I respond that St. Thomas and Gregory [of Nyssa] are speaking of counsel according to the conditions it has in us. Yet the proper nature of counsel consists in the elective judgment of some means in relation to an end — which means, according to its own nature, does not have necessary connection with the end, but rather the attainment of the end could have stood without it. It happens however at times, because of human ignorance, that men inquire into means and compare them to one another, by which they may attain an end absolutely willed — even though it often happens that there is only one means necessary by its own nature for attaining the intended end, which if they had known beforehand, they would not have deliberated at all. But God most perfectly knows that for the attainment of his end — which is the object of divine goodness — no means is necessary, nor does anything contribute to a better attainment of the end. Yet he operates all things according to the counsel of his will — that is, according to a counsel that is voluntary and free. For it is a Hebrew idiom that a genitive supplies the place of a denominative and a superlative — as in "the kingdom of the Son of his love," meaning "the kingdom of his most beloved Son." So "the counsel of his will" means "a counsel most voluntary and free."To the second argument, in order to respond, it must be noted that "indifferent" or "indifference" can be understood in two ways. In one way, negatively — that is, not differing, not determined, not a difference, not a determination. In another way, privatively — so that something is called indifferent that is apt to be determined but is not yet determined, but still remains in potency toward either option. Like a man who has not yet decided to take a wife, nor decided not to. The answer therefore to the argument is that indifference understood in the first way is not repugnant to God, in this sense: that by his nature and from his proper substance he does not have determination to will anything outside himself. But if indifference is taken in the second way, it is repugnant to God — because God was never suspended with regard to possibles and things producible by him, but whatever he has done in time he willed and deliberated from eternity to exist in time, and whatever he has not done and will not do in time, he decreed from eternity not to do. And thus it is verified that privatively understood indifference is not in God. But now let us begin to gather some necessary property of free will. For what is required is not indifference toward either option in the privative sense — namely, that there be aptitude toward either option and no determination to either. This happens in us because of the imperfection of free will. But the perfection of the operation of free will is when such indifference is in the faculty of free will in the negative sense — in this sense: that on the part of the nature of the one deliberating, no determination to the one or the other is found. Hence it was well responded when the argument was proposed. For indeed all that indifference, if considered privatively, is to be referred to the being or non-being of the creature. And even if indifference is considered negatively, it is not to be placed in God with respect to any divine act as it is in God, but only in relation to the extrinsic relation to the being or non-being of the creature. And to the counter-reply of the argument I respond that that indifference, as placed in God by us, can be compared to all creatures, even possible ones — whether they coexist or do not coexist with eternity. For the divine will is not determined from its nature to producing any creature, since no creature has necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the proper object of the divine will. However, the divine will never was or can be, as it were, suspended with regard to any creature, but from eternity has immutably willed and wills whatever it wills to happen, and immutably does not will whatever it does not will to happen. Hence it is gathered that mutability does not pertain to the proper nature of free will.To the third argument: I deny the inference. To the proof I respond that that maxim, celebrated among the philosophers — "a total cause remaining in the same state," etc. — is verified in created causes, which have a limited and finite mode of being and operating; but not in the first cause of all things, which, since it is unlimited and infinite existence itself, contains in itself the power of operating or not operating — without any possibility of being otherwise in itself, but only through the mutability of the effect does it operate otherwise than it previously operated. It must therefore be conceded that the divine will would not be otherwise in itself if it had not willed to create the world than it now is having willed to create. But the world itself is much otherwise when it actually receives being from him and is really referred to him as to its first efficient cause — whereas if it had not been created, it would be referred to God only by a relation of reason. I freely confess that it is difficult for us to understand the free production of things by the divine will, together with such great and ineffable immutability. Yet from what we know naturally, we can be somewhat guided toward some understanding of so great a majesty. For we see that two contraries cannot come together in the same material subject, and yet a single power receives the species of white and black without variation in itself. Furthermore, the distinct objects of the five senses, which are proper to each and mutually incommunicable, a single sense called the common sense knows under a single simple species their differences. And finally the intellect, under a simpler species, perceives the differences of many things in a simpler and more immutable manner. Theologians are accustomed to pursue this reasoning even with respect to angels — therefore, speaking consistently, it is no wonder if the divine purity and majesty, whose intellect and will are a simple substance, and whose substance is simple and infinite existence, could, without any shadow of mutability, have not created the world which it created — remaining in the same state creating the world as it would be in not creating it.To the fourth argument: I respond from the teaching of St. Thomas in I, q. 64, art. 2, ad 3, that there remains still in the devil the sin by which he first sinned, as regards appetite, even if it does not remain as regards his believing he can obtain what he desires. Just as if someone were to believe he could commit homicide and willed to do it, and then the power were taken from him, the will to commit homicide could nonetheless remain in him — so that he wills he had done it, or wills to do it if he could. So Thomas. And in the reply to the first objection he had said that good and bad angels have free will, but according to the mode and condition of their nature. We have therefore from St. Thomas's teaching that there is no contradiction in an act being free and yet being immutable by reason of the perfection of the angelic nature — immutable, I said, in the sense that the angel cannot choose the opposite; not however in the sense that he cannot suspend the free action. For this is possible for the angel, and to that extent he is mutable and measurable by time. To the argument therefore I respond that the angel still sins the sin of pride which he sinned from the beginning; and whether in the meantime he suspends the act of pride or does not suspend it (which seems more probable to me, and will be explained below in q. 64), yet in that act of sin there is still freedom, even though he immutably adheres and immutably chooses what he once chose. As for what was inferred in argument 4 as an inconvenience — that as the demon's guilt increases, his punishment would also increase in eternity without limit — St. Thomas responds in book 2 of the Sentences, d. 7, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5, that some say the guilt and punishment of demons can increase up to the day of judgment. But this does not seem true, because since they are not in the state of the way, just as they cannot change toward the good, so neither can they change toward the worse. Hence it must be said that their guilt or pride is said to increase not as regards the intensity of malice, but as regards the multiplicity of acts. So too the essential punishment does not increase, but the accidental punishment does — which arises from the multitude of the damned — just as it is also with the reward of the good angels.To the fifth argument from the opinion of Aristotle: I respond that we need not esteem Aristotle so highly as to assert that he was an infallible rule of natural reason in everything. Indeed he himself in his teaching is quite ambiguous concerning the immortality of souls and then concerning the assertion of free will in God. In other places besides those cited he seems to hold the opposite — for example, in Topics book 4, chapter 5, he says: "God and men can do many things that they do not do." And in Ethics book 1, chapter 8, he asserts that those who are truly wise are most dear to God, and that he confers the greatest benefits upon them. And in Ethics chapter 7, he teaches that God has friendship toward men — not indeed as between equals, but from supereminence. All of which cannot be true unless God has free will.

But now at last I judge it will be greatly worthwhile for the benefit of theologians, as I gather from the aforesaid assertion of divine free will certain teachings by which they may be able to resolve many theological difficulties that are accustomed to greatly torment some in public disputations. First teaching. It is sufficiently received that the freedom of will does not consist in the ability to sin. For although from the fact that someone sins, or can sin, we rightly conclude that he has the faculty of free will, yet conversely it does not follow: "This will is free — therefore it can sin." For behold, God himself is most free, and yet is far from the possibility of sinning. Likewise, Christ the Lord, insofar as he is man, is impeccable — if the particle "insofar as" is not taken reduplicatively, as the dialecticians say; for in that sense the proposition "Christ insofar as he is man is impeccable" would be false, because this proposition included in it would be false: "Every man is impeccable." But if the word "insofar as" is taken specificatively, so that the meaning is that Christ through his humanity, or through his human will, cannot sin, the proposition is true — because such a sin would be attributed to the divine suppositum; and yet through the human will he is free and can merit. The reason for this teaching is most frequent in the doctrine of Augustine. For to be able to sin is not a power, but a weakness of free will. Therefore if through God's grace man is cured of this weakness, his freedom is in no way destroyed but rather perfected. As was done in the Blessed Virgin through the fullness of the grace of sanctification, so that she could not sin even venially; and in all those confirmed in grace, so that they can no longer sin mortally — and nonetheless they remain free and can merit in the observance of the commandments, as we shall explain more fully later.Second teaching. There is no contradiction to the freedom of will with respect to means — indeed it is a greater perfection of free will — that the will itself should be naturally and necessarily inclined toward the ultimate end, or also through God's grace and through supernatural gifts is determined, as if naturally, toward the ultimate end. Indeed, the freedom with respect to means that have no necessary connection with the end will be all the more perfect, the more the will itself is determined with respect to the end. Behold the example of the divine will, which necessarily and naturally loves the highest good, and is nonetheless most perfectly free with respect to all creatures that are ordered toward the ultimate end, since they have no necessary connection with it. Similarly, the will of man is naturally determined toward good in general as regards the specification of the act, and is nonetheless free even as regards the specification of the act with respect to certain means that have no necessary connection with the good in general, which is the object of the will. Indeed, even if the will were naturally determined as regards the exercise of the act toward willing good in general, it would nonetheless remain free with respect to such means — though not with respect to those things which have necessary and intrinsic connection from their own nature with the object of the will, such as being and living, which have necessary connection with the good that is desired.The third teaching, to be especially observed, is that the freedom of the act of will — which formally exists in the will itself — arises from the root of the act of the intellect — namely, from such an act and judgment of the intellect. For the intellect proposes to the will an object that is in itself indifferent with respect to the attainment of the object of the will and has no necessary connection with it, and yet judges it to be orderable toward the end of the will, or toward the attainment of that end, or toward participating in some goodness from the end. And then it judges that it is to be ordered toward the end — and then the will chooses, and in such a choice is formally free. This freedom arises as from a root from the aforesaid judgment of the intellect. (And it must be noted incidentally that we place the indifference in the object itself as judged, and it is not necessary to understand indifference to be in the intellect itself or in its act — as we have already said is not found in the divine intellect.) We have therefore that what is necessary for the freedom of the act of the will is that the indifference of the means to be chosen be judged by the intellect, and that such a means be simultaneously judged as to be determined toward the end. This judgment is indeed practical and necessarily conjoined with the choice of the will as its effective root from which the actual freedom of the agent operating through the will originates. Let those who do not wish to err in resolving questions about merit and the nature of meriting observe this teaching carefully — which I demonstrate in no other way than from the foregoing. For God is most free, as has now been settled, and yet in him no other reason for freedom is found with respect to the things he wills outside himself, except that he judges them to have no necessary connection with the end, but to be in themselves indifferent. Yet he judges them to be orderable toward the end, and judges that they are to be ordered. And this is the reason why the willing to order is free. See therefore, theologian, whether we do injury to our free will, when we gather that: the more perfectly the rational and intellectual creature will be free in its operation, the more that operation will be assimilated to the divine free operation — after whose image and likeness it has been made according to intellect and will.

But you say: so it is. Now then attend to the corollaries which we gather by evident consequence from the foregoing. The first is: as often as an act of will arises from the aforesaid root of judgment, it will always be free. Hence I gather further: whatever has preceded, or accompanies, or supervenes upon the act of will — if it does not destroy that judgment concerning the means in relation to the end — will not destroy the freedom of the operation. This consequence is evident, because given the definition of a free act, the act must necessarily be free. Now therefore approach the more difficult matters gradually. The eternal and immutable counsel of the divine will precedes our free operation, and so does the infallible predefinition of divine providence, which has predefined every good free operation — indeed, every operation insofar as it is good and is exercised concerning good. But because God himself, by his providence and immutable counsel, does not bind or destroy our judgment by which we judge the indifference of the means and its orderability and that it is to be ordered toward the end — he does not therefore destroy the freedom of our operation either, but rather efficaciously produces, fosters, and preserves it. Behold how our freedom of operation stands together with infallible and efficacious divine providence — indeed, without it it could not stand at all. Now you will understand more clearly, concerning the grace of God and the efficacious divine aids and precepts, how they are not opposed to the freedom of our will, but rather favor it. The reason is evident, if you are unwilling to deny the aforesaid teaching which you have necessarily conceded. For all of these things are so far from disturbing or binding the judgment of our reason — so that it cannot judge in the aforesaid manner the indifference of the object — that they rather illuminate it, perfect it, and raise it to the likeness of God. Behold, says the Prophet in Psalm 18: "The commandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes." And when he again asks: "Perfect my steps in your paths, that my footsteps may not be moved" — is he asking that freedom be taken from him by divine aid? Certainly not. Rather, he entreats that he be perfected in the observance of the commandments. Similarly, when the Bride asks: "Draw me, we will run after you" — is she praying for an efficacious aid so that she may not walk by her own steps, that is, by free affections? No — rather she desires that she may run more freely and swiftly. Let it therefore be far from the Catholic and pious theologian to defend freedom of will while diminishing the efficacy of divine providence, divine grace, and the obligation of divine precept, in order to assert the freedom of operation of those confirmed in grace.

Finally, let us gather that among all intellectual creatures the most perfect freedom of operation was in the soul of Christ the Lord, because it was assimilated above all others to divine freedom. First, because through the hypostatic union it was made impeccable. For since it existed in the nature of things under no other personhood than the personhood of the Word, if the soul of Christ were to sin, the sin would be attributed to the Word itself. Furthermore, because Christ the Lord, by the light of glory, clearly beheld the divine predefinition and precept of dying concerning himself and his operations, as an most excellent exemplar — just as was said to Moses: "See, and make according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain" (Exodus 25). All of these things perfected the freedom of his will and illuminated the practical judgment of the intellect, by which Christ more certainly and evidently judged the indifference of means toward the end and their orderability, together with the divine ordering or pre-ordering. Hence Christ the Lord himself, subordinated to the same ordering, ordered those same things toward the ultimate end out of the immense charity with which he was borne toward the ultimate end.

And in this he was also assimilated to God, who necessarily loves himself, while he loves us freely. So too the soul of Christ the Lord necessarily loves God himself and all means that have necessary connection from within with the attainment of that end — namely, with the beatific vision of the soul of Christ — and thus it wills the light of glory as proper to its own intellect and its own being. But the rest of the things that do not from within have necessary connection with the attainment of the end, even though they have it by supposition of a precept — these he willed freely. Consistent with this teaching is what we read in Psalm 39, which is understood literally of Christ as the Apostle testifies in Hebrews 10: "In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do your will." (Behold, the divine predefinition and immutability of the divine will preceded — by which it was predefined and willed what Christ would do.) Then follows: "My God, I willed it." Behold the free act of the soul of Christ, subordinated to God, by which he willed to obey even unto death, embracing with immense but free affection the law of dying the death of the cross. And this is what he says: "And your law is in the midst of my heart."

From the foregoing it finally follows that one would greatly and dangerously err who were to assert that Christ the Lord neither merited nor could have merited by obeying the precept of dying — unless he willed to obey more intensely than he was held to by the obligation of the precept. This certain persons wished to confirm by the following argument: because it cannot be properly understood how, given the precept of dying, the soul of Christ could freely will to die — since, given the precept, it could not not-will to die; therefore, in order for him to merit through the act of obedience, one must assert in that act an intensity that was not enjoined under the precept. This argument is indeed ridiculous and proceeds quite freely from ignorance of the definition of a free act, and it seems to us unworthy of being refuted at length after the foregoing teachings. Nor is it pertinent here and now to examine and show with precision how much danger lies hidden — or rather (to speak more accurately) lies open — in that assertion. For my part I would not dare without danger to my own position to affirm that such an opinion is in any way probable. But we shall speak more opportunely on this matter, the Lord willing, without whom it is nothing. So much has been said on this most grave doubt, subject to the correction of the Roman Church.

A second question is raised concerning this article: whether at the present moment, in fact, there is in God a real power to will that Antichrist should not be future. Cajetan, above on article 7, ad 4, holds that in God, at the present time, there is no real power for this. He proves it first as follows: power for opposites places mutability in that in which it resides, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics book 9. But God is altogether immutable — therefore he does not have power for opposites. Second argument: if God can now will that Antichrist not exist, then he can change. The consequence is proved, because he has already now willed that Antichrist exist — therefore he would cease to will what he willed, and this is to change. And finally St. Thomas himself in the passage cited and in Contra Gentiles book I, chapter 82, seems to hold this opinion. Nonetheless, Cajetan concedes that the proposition "God can will that Antichrist not exist" is true if the word "can" is taken absolutely. Scotus, however, holds the opposite opinion in book I, distinction 39 — an opinion followed by many among modern theologians, even Thomists. And it is proved first because God can bring it about that Antichrist not exist — therefore he can will it. I prove the antecedent: when God will create the soul of Antichrist, he will create it freely, and not by necessity of nature — therefore he can bring it about that Antichrist not exist. Second argument: God is most perfectly free with respect to all things outside himself — therefore he has true and real power for either option. The consequence is clear from the definition of free will. Finally, before God produced the world, I ask: did he have real power not to produce it, or did he not have such power? If the first — then he simply has now real power not to produce Antichrist. If the second — then he produced the world by necessity and not freely. The consequence is clear, because from eternity he did not have the power not to produce it. For the resolution of this difficulty, which seems to us to be a question of terminology, a distinction must be made when it is asked whether at the present moment in God there is real power not to produce Antichrist and to will the opposite of what he has willed. For if the word "now" makes a composite sense with the two opposites — that is, given the supposition and truth of one opposite, the other opposite is also verified — then the answer must be negative: there is no such power in God, nor can there be. But if the word "now" makes a composition of one opposite with the power to do the other, it would be blasphemous to deny that God now has real power to bring it about that Antichrist not exist, and to will that Antichrist not exist. The earlier opinion of Cajetan therefore proceeds in the composite sense, while the other opinion proceeds in the divided sense and speaking absolutely. But speaking absolutely, the second opinion holds the truth — and with it the immutability of the divine will stands well, which, though it can do the opposite, will never do it nor will it — and in this consists the being of an immutable will. And through this it is clear what must be said in response to the arguments of each opinion.

-Banez commentary on ST. I vol 1