Why we should reject the property interpretation for divine simplicity

Plantinga highlighted the absurdity of the PA more than anyone else has. Since his 1980 monograph (does God have a nature) the community has been asking if its coherent to say that God is identical with his attributes. Plantinga gives 2 reason to reject it

“In the first place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that he has but one property. . . . In the second place, if God is identical with each of his properties, then since each of his properties is a property, he is a property – a self-exemplifying property.” Plantinga 1980, p. 47

2.

“No property could have created the world; no property could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems to be an utt er mistake.`Plantinga 1980, p. 47`

Property as universals: Plantinga espouses a form of platonic realism -> a conception of properties according to which they are a specific type of abstract entity (universals). If we’re to defend the coherence of identifying God with a property, we must formulate a theory of properties according to which at least some properties are both concrete and individual.

Properties as concrete individuals: the thesis of William Mann, according to him, when medievals such as St. Thomas identifies God with his nature, goodness, power they do so with the intention of identifying God with what he calls property instances. Property instances = concrete individuals of which they are the instances. We need to distinguish between the 2 kinds of property (abstract universals i.e. goodness, power, wisdom) and concrete individual properties i.e. (God’s goodness, God’s power, God’s wisdom). Maan suggests that the doctrine of the medievals identifies God with the properties of the latter sort.. Meaning that If God and one of his creatures are both good, it will be true that they both stand in relation to the same universal, goodness. However, it will also be true that they stand in this relation by virtue of possessing their own numerically distinct concrete individual instances of goodness (God’s goodness which is identical to God) and (Socrates goodness which is distinct from him). If this were true then the medieval doctrine can preserve that God is a concrete individual.

If God is a property instance then he will lack aseity (another reason why we should reject this interpretation of DS). Mann’s conception of PI is that they’re dependent for their existence on the universals of which they’re the instances. Hence, if God is identical with his Goodness, even where his goodness is conceived as a property instance, God will depend for his existence on something distinct from himself (universal property of which his goodness is an instance, being good) and the same will be true for each of his other PI’s.

If we deny the Platonic aspect of Maan’s thesis, we end up with what we now know as tropes. Even a trope theoretic version of maan’s PI interpretation wouldnt suffice. Because even though it would avoid making him dependent on a universal, it wouldnt succeed in in making him absolutely independent. Due to tropes being dependent beings (concrete individuals depending for their existence on something distinct from themselves).

A final stage a PI defender can take, is to reject that properties and tropes in general must be conceived of as entities capable of being exemplified. This view also fails because according to the traditional view both properties and substances may be the subject of further properties, hence they can both be said to exemplify other things. But only substances are such that they cant be exemplified by anything else.

Syllogism against any version of the PI

p1 God is a substance

p2 No substance can be a property (i.e. an exemplifiable)

c Therefore God cant be identical with a property (no matter how the entities of this type are conceived)

on p1: according to classical theism, God is a person, persons are substances.

on p2: central tenet of our conception of properties that whatever they are, they arent substances.

All of the justifications for leaving the traditional method are ad hoc