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On evil

Sep 15
9 min read

evil is the privation of good:

one of the 2 opposites is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence its necessary to grasp from the good what evil is, since evil is the opposite of good. Now evil is opposed to good either contrarily or privately, according to different respects. If evil is taken concretely as the subject that is called evil, it is opposed contrarily, as vice is contrarily opposed to virtue; but if its taken formally as the ground according to which something is called evil, its opposed privately and is thus defined: the privation of a due good. The good, formally taken, therefore doesnt imply and being, form, or perfection but only the absence of a due good. For indeed, whatever is desirable is good. But every being desires its being, its form. Therefore every being, every form, or nature, is some good; consequently evil signifies neither being, nor form, nor any nature. It remains, then, that by the name evil a certain absence of good is meant. Yet not every lack of good suffices for the notion of evil otherwise it would follow that things which in no way exist would be evil, and again that any thing would be evil from the fact that it doesnt have the good of another thing as that a man would be evil because he doesnt have the speed of a goat, or strength of a lion. Evil therefore is constituted by the absence of a due good either a good due to the thing itself as when something is said to be evil in itself; or a good due to another, as when something is said to be evil in itself or a good due to another as when something is said to be evil, or harmful, to another. Hence is understood the saying evil is distant both from being simply and from non being simply because its neither like a habit nor like a pure negation but like a privation.

division of evil:

evil is adequately divided into physical and moral evilproof: every evil is either an evil of the thing or an evil of the act. But the evil of the thing = physical and the evil of the act = moral. Ergo the thesis holdsproof of major: evil is the privation of good, which consists principally per se in perfection and act. Now act is 2fold (first and second): the first is the thing itself that is the the form or integrity of the thing; the second is the operation. Therefore evil will be twofold: evil of the thing, which is the privation of form, or of some part required for the thing’s integrity (as blindness is an evil, and lacking a limb); and evil of the act, which is the privation of due free operation either because it doesnt occur, or because it doesnt have its due mode and order. There is no metaphysical evil, such as leibniz holds. Evil of this kind would be the imperfection or limitation of any created thing the lack of a perfection not owed to it. But limitation or the lack of a further perfection is essential to the creature and isnt an evil to it: hence a man isnt reckoned evil because he lacks the speed of a goat or the strength of a lion as st. thomas observes. Evil properly is that which deprives a thing of a due perfection and this privation is eiether of the thing or of the act: physical or moral evil as was noted by sanseverino in his ontology n.170.

evil of guilt and the evil of punishment:

in voluntary agents, evil takes on a special character and a special name. For the good is simply the object of the will; wherefore evil, which is the privation of good is found in a special way in rational creatures endowed with will. Physical evil has the nature of punishment, because its contrary to the will and is inflicted, by the order of divine providence and justice, as punishment for sin. Moral evil has the nature of guild: this is imputed to someone as a fault when he falls short of a perfection action of which he is master by his will. Thus every evil considered in voluntary things is either punishment or guilt sin or the punishment of sin.

guilt has more of the character of evil than punishment does:

the good simply consists in act. But the ultimate act is operation, that is, the use of thing possessed. Therefore man’s good simply is to be place in the good use of things. But we use all things through the will. Therefore from the good will by which a man uses well the things he possesses, he is called a good man, and from an evil will, an evil man. For one who has an evil will can misuse even the good he has as when a grammarian voluntarily speaks incorrectly. Now guilt consists in an evil or a disordered act of the will; punishment, however, doesnt consist in an evil will, but in the privation of some of the things the will uses. Therefore from the evil of guilt someone becomes evil, but not from the evil of punishment. Therefore guilt has more perfectly the nature of evil than punishment does. Moreover that is the greater evil which deprives of the greater good. But punishment deprives one of the good of the creature, while guilt is properly opposed to the uncreated good, since its contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will and to the divine love by which the divine good is loved in itself, and not merely as participated by the creature. Therefore guilt is a greater evil than punishment. Finally the evil of punishment is imposed or inflicted on account of the evil of guilt. But the greater is not inflicted on account of the lesser but the reverse. Ergo guilt is the greater evil.

perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things:

the perfection of the universe requires that all degrees of goodness be present in things, at least generic degrees. Now the degrees of goodness are such that a thing may be so good that it can never fall short of the good just as among things there are also found beings that can never lose their being (the incorruptible) and others that can lose their being (the corruptible). Therefore the perfection of the universe, just as it requires that there be incorruptible and corruptible beings, likewise requires that there be beings indefectible from good and beings defectible from good. But to fall short of the good is a certain evil. Ergo the perfection of the universe requires that some evil be found in things. Evil, ergo exists really in things not as some positive being but as a real corruption and a real privation: there exists in the world beings that are really deprived of some good, or of some perfection due to them.

what is the cause of evil:

a 4fold cause is generally assigned: efficient, material, formal, and final.

> “Evil has no formal cause, but is rather the privation of form; and likewise it has no final cause, but is rather the privation of order toward a due end. For not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful which is ordered toward the end.”

> `St. Thomas, I, q. 49, a. 1`

Hence the question is raised only concerning the material and efficient cause.

evil is in the good as in a subject or material cause:

Proof: evil is the privation of good. But every privation demands a subject, since its a negation in a subject. Therefore evil requires a subject. Now every subject is some being, and therefore some good, since every being is convertible with good. Therefore evil requires the good as its subject. Hence if evil were found without any admixture of good without any good subject in which to be received, it would thereby vanish, as the Philosopher says:

> “if evil were total, it would destroy itself.”

> `Aristotle, IV Ethics, ch. 5 (al. 11)`

evil is from the good as from an agent cause, yet not per se, but per accidens:

proof of part 1: evil is the defect of a good that is naturally apt to be had, and ought to be had. But nothing falls short of what it is naturally apt to have except from some cause drawing the thing outside its proper disposition: thus a heavy body is not moved upward except by something impelling it, nor does an agent fall short of its action except through some impediment. Therefore evil arises from some cause drawing the thing outside its disposition. But being a cause can belong only to the good, since nothing can be a cause except insofar as its a being, and therefore insofar as its good being and good being convertible. Therefore the cause producing evil effectively can only be good.proof of part 2: whatever is per se the cause of something tends, of itself, toward its proper effect. But its repugnant that a good agent should tend toward evil as its proper effect. Therefore evil results only per accidens.proof of the minor: every agent intends an effect like itself, for its the end of an agent to assimilate its effect to itself. Therefore a good agent intends, of itself, a good effect. If then an evil effect follows this is beside the intention and per accidens.now this accident can occur in natural things either on the part of the cause or on the part of the effect. On the part of the cause, it occurs in two ways: 1. from the very power, or perfection, of the agent; 2. from a defect of the agent. From the perfection of the agent when the privation of another form necessarily follows upon the form intended by the agent, as the privation of the form of wood follows upon the induction of the form of fire. This indeed happens from the perfection of fire, which, the stronger its in power, the more perfectly it impresses its own form and destroys its contrary; yet on the other hand it happens per accidens, because fire does not intend to deprive wood of its form, but to induce its own form and in doing so, it causes that privation also, but per accidens. From a defect of the agent this happens either through the weakness of the principal cause as the defect of motive power in children, or through the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. Yet the agent, whether principal or instrumental, does not cause evil insofar as its an efficient cause, but insofar as its a deficient cause: for as efficient its a being in act, a perfect being, and therefore produces good. Therefore if evil follows that is a defect of being and a defect of due perfection this comes from the cause as deficient. Hence the saying evil has not an efficient cause, but a deficient one. In the effect moreover, evil arises sometimes from a defect of action, which redounds into a defect of some principle, as already said; sometimes from an indisposition of the matter, which is not apt to receive the impression of the agent, from an indisposition of the matter, which isnt apt to receive the impression of the agent, from which a defect necessarily follows in the effect as when monstrous births occur on account of the indisposition of the matter. In voluntary agents moral evil is considered not from the matter or form of the effect, but follows from the agent.Now the principal agent of a moral act is the will, since its from this that an act is called moral namely, because its voluntary. In the act of the will, therefore must the root and origin of moral sin be sought. But of these matters, read the moralists since they treat this in depth.

If God can be the cause of evil:

1. God can in no way be the cause of the evil of guilt. For the evil of guilt is a withdrawal from God. But God cant be the cause of a withdrawal from himself, as is evident. Ergo he cant be its cause.2. God cant be the cause of evil that arises from a defect of the agent, since hes supreme power and supreme perfection3. God is the per accidens cause of the evil that consists in the corruption of certain things. An agent, insofar as by its power it produces some form upon which corruption and defect follow, causes that corruption and defect per accidens by its power. Now the form which God causes in things is the good of the order of the universe, which requires that there be corruptions and defects in things. Therefore God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, causes per accidens the corruptions of things, that is, physical evil.4. God causes the evil of punishment. For God causes the order of the universe. But the order of justice also belongs to the order of the universe, and this requires that a condign punishment be inflicted on sinners. Therefore God causes the evil of punishment by procuring the order of justice.

Its repugnant that there exist any evil nature, and a fortiori, one supreme evil that is the cause of all evil:

among the persians there flourished the doctrine of 2 principles, good and evil, which the gnostics, the manicheans and the albigensians successively revived: there would then be good substances from a supreme good, and evil substances from a supreme evil. Such madness scarcely needs refutation; nevertheless each part is briefly explainedpart 1: every substance has first being, and therefore good being, though not good simply. Whatever is in a nature whether essence or accidents implies nothing but good: essence is a first and perfect act, existence is a second and more perfect act, accident have the nature of the perfective and completive.part 2: since evil is the privation of being or non-being, the supreme evil would be supreme non-being. But its a contradiction in terms for the supreme non-being to exist. Therefore it cannot. Moreover the supreme evil would be a total evil. But if evil were total it would destroy itself, since then there would be no subject in which to be received and once the subject is removed, evil itself is removed.

 
 
 

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